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In the first chapter, using new patent-based industry-level measures of the horizons and
values of corporate investment, I find that in response to an increase in long-term institu-
tional ownership firms reallocate their capital toward divisions with long product life-cycle
and high innovation value, which leads to longer corporate investment horizons and higher
investment values at firm level. To disentangle investors’ effects from spurious correlations,
I employ a widely-adopted identification strategy based on the discontinuity in long-term
ownerships around Russell 1000/2000 index thresholds. The effects are strongest among
firms with more undervaluation. I also document a possible channel through which in-
vestors affect corporate investment horizon - the managerial incentive channel. These
results are consistent with the horizon alignment hypothesis that long-term investors could
mitigate inefficient corporate short-termisms in real investment decisions among underval-
ued firms.
In the second chapter, we show that Korean business groups, chaebol, reduced (increased)
investment in risky (safe) member firms in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Risk reduction was accompanied by capital reallocation from risky member firms to safe
member firms through equity investments. Consequently, chaebol reduced investment to a
lesser extent than otherwise similar stand-alone firms did while reducing risk to a greater
extent. Risk reduction was stronger among chaebol with greater variability in risk across
member firms and with greater dependence on external financing . Our results suggest
that within-group risk variability along with internal capital markets enabled chaebol to
effectively reduce risk in response to the increased cost of external financing.
The final chapter documents a new cost of insider ownership; we call this the minority-
alignment cost. This cost arises when a higher share of insider ownership incentivizes the
insider to act in the best interest of a minority of shareholders. These actions thus hurt
the interests of the majority of shareholders and therefore reduce firm value. We document
ii
evidence consistent with this cost of insider ownership using a natural experiment created
by the 2012 presidential election and the impending fiscal cliff. In this setting, insiders (who
are subject to dividend taxes) had a personal incentive to pay out large special dividends,
and this incentive was stronger for insiders who owned larger shares of their firms. We show
that when insider ownership was high, firms were less responsive to tax incentives of their
investor base (i.e., the fraction of taxable vs. non-taxable shareholders). Moreover, when
there was greater misalignment (high insider ownership combined with high ownership by
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF INVESTOR HORIZONS ON
CORPORATE INVESTMENT HORIZONS
1.1 Introduction
What determines firms’ choices of investment project horizons? This has long been a
central question in the world of corporations.1 While it is controversial whether short-
termism is socially bad or not, corporate short-termism could be inefficient for the firms
in certain circumstances, especially when managers choose short-term investment projects
over more valuable long-term ones. In the real world, firms manage several projects at the
same time and a corporation can be thought of as a portfolio with multiple investment
projects with different horizons and values. Therefore, the more specific question would
be as following: what affects within-firm capital reallocations across investment projects
(or divisions) with different horizons and intrinsic values, thereby the overall horizon and
value of corporate investments as well?
This study focuses on investor horizon as the main determinant of corporate investment
horizons. Short-term trading behaviors by investors have been suspected to be one of
the main causes of short-termisms among firms, if any. For example, the literature has
shown that short-term investors pressure firms to temporarily cut R&D expenditures to
meet short-term earnings goals (Bushee (1998) and Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2016)).
Froot, Perold, and Stein (1992) also attempt in their cross-country study to prove this
belief on short-term trading practices as a driving force that shortens corporate investment
horizons. In this context, it has been proposed that lengthening investor horizons could
mitigate such short-term preferences by corporations on investment decisions.2
1For example, the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine published a book in 1992
where discussed are the potential causes of short-term preferences by U.S. firms in deciding among many
technological innovation opportunities and possible solutions to such short-termism problems (National
Academy of Engineering (1992))
2For instance, Hillary Clinton proposed U.S. corporate tax reforms in July 2015 that include doubling
1
Empirically testing this proposition is challenging mainly because researchers do not
observe investment projects within a company, thereby being unable to measure corporate
investment horizons. I detour this difficulty using a patent-citation-based product life-cycle
length index by industry for the sample of U.S. diversified firms with multiple segments. To
measure the product life-cycle length for each industry, I follow Bilir (2014) and pick the
median average forward citation lags across all patents in the industry, where the average
forward citation lag for each patent is defined as the average of time lapse between the
cited patent’s grant date and a subsequent citation across all citing patents. This industry-
level product life-cycle length measures the life-span of a new technology and is used as
the proxy for investment horizon for each division based on the division’s industry. As
a firm’s overall investment horizon, I use the asset-weighted average of product life-cycle
length across all divisions. This firm-level corporate investment horizon varies across time
by firms reallocating their capitals across divisions within firm. For the measure of investor
horizon, I follow the literature (e.g., Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)) and use the
widely-used turnover-based long-term institutional ownership.
Using these investment horizon measures of firms and investors for a panel of firm-year
observations of the U.S. conglomerates over a period of 20 years, I find that long-term
institutional ownership is positively associated with corporate investment horizon: a one-
standard-deviation increase in long-term ownership is associated with eight months and two
weeks increase in the average product life-cycle length, which is approximately 49.8% of its
standard deviation. I also document a positive relationship between long-term ownership
and the value of corporate investment: a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term
ownership is associated with an increase in corporate investment value by 4.7%.3
I next examine a channel through which investors can influence managers’ decisions
on investment horizons. If corporate managers’ compensations are associated more with
short-term performance of their firms, the managers would care more about divisions with
short-term investment projects. Therefore, long-term investors could mitigate this short-
termism by affecting the managers’ compensation structures. To test this implication, I
explore grant-level data on CEO compensation. More specifically, I develop a firm-year-
the short-term holding period from one year to two years, which could eventually have resulted in a sharp
increase in the U.S. capital gains tax rates for investments held for fewer than two years.
3I proxy the value of corporate investment by the asset-weighted average of industry-level economic
value of innovation across all divisions of the firm, where the industry-level innovation value is the aver-
age of Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman’s (2017) announcement-return-based measure of patent’s
economic values across all patents in each industry.
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level (CEO-year-level) measure of incentive horizon based on the vesting periods of each
performance-based grant and repeat the baseline tests replacing the dependent variable
with this incentive horizon measure. The results support the aforementioned implication.
For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term ownership is associated with a
lengthened CEO incentive horizon by four months and two weeks, which is approximately
53% of the standard deviation of the incentive horizon.
The evidence from these panel regressions is, however, subject to endogeneity issues:
either may there be omitted factors that affect both long-term ownership and corporate
investment horizon, or it may be the reverse causality that drives the documented horizon
alignment effects between investors and firms, that is, long-term investors may actively
choose their portfolio stocks of which corporate investment horizons are expected to be
long.
To address this endogeneity concern and establish a causal inference on the effect of long-
term ownership, I employ an identification strategy based on the sharp discontinuity in
long-term institutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 indexes threshold. Every
year, the largest 3000 stocks are ranked by the Russell based on market capitalization,
and the first 1000 and the following 2000 stocks are assigned to the Russell 1000 and
2000 indexes, respectively. Then within each index, the stocks are assigned their index
weights based on the market capitalization ranking. Hence, the firms of their stocks on
the top of the Russell 2000 index have sharply larger index weights than those of their
stocks on the bottom of the Russell 1000 index. On the other hand, there is no significant
difference in all other metrics including market capitalization among those firms in a narrow
bandwidth around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Finally, since the Russell indexes are
the most widely-adopted indexes by quasi-indexing institutional investors who are long-
term investors at the same time, long-term institutional ownership is sharply higher for the
firms slightly below the threshold than those slightly above it. This discontinuity around
the index threshold existing only in long-term institutional ownership enables the Russell
2000 index membership to satisfy the exclusion restriction and hence makes it possible to
identify the causal effect of long-term institutional ownership.
With this strategy, the results from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions, by in-
strumenting the long-term institutional ownership by the Russell 2000 index membership
and confining the sample to a narrow bandwidth (±100) around the Russell 1000/2000
threshold, support the causal effects of long-term ownership on both corporate invest-
ment horizon and the value of corporate investment: a one-standard-deviation increase in
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long-term ownership not only leads to six months and three weeks increase in the average
product life-cycle lengths, but also results in an increase in the firm’s average economic
value of innovative projects by 4.1%, which are approximately 54% and 20% of the stan-
dard deviations of the average product life-cycle lengths and the corporate investment
value, respectively, for the sample used in these 2SLS specifications. Therefore, long-term
institutional investors indeed have positive and (both statistically and economically) sig-
nificant influence on corporate investment horizons and values. I also document the causal
effect of investor horizon on CEO’s incentive horizon, which confirms the possible workings
of incentive horizon channel: a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term ownership
is followed by an increase in the average vesting period of the CEO’s performance-based
grants by three months and two weeks.
A cross-sectional analysis using several proxies for undervaluation based on residual book-
to-markets or future excess returns shows that all these effects become much stronger or
even only exist for highly undervalued firms. Moreover, test results from segment-level
specifications provide further evidence that firms increase their overall horizons and values
of corporate investments in response to an increase in long-term ownerships by raising capi-
tal expenditures of divisions with long product life-cycles and high innovation values, while
reducing those of divisions with short product life-cycles and low innovation values, which
suggests an internal capital market channel through which managers of multi-segment firms
dynamically adjust the horizons and values of investment projects. Finally, I repeat the
same 2SLS regressions, but this time decomposing long-term ownership into block and
non-block ownerships and instrumenting long-term block ownership by the Russell 2000
index membership, and find that the same positive causal effects hold, which reinforces
the plausibility of long-term investors’ real effects on managers’ incentive plans and their
choices of investment projects.
Combined altogether, these results provide empirical evidence that is loosely consistent
with implications from a theoretical model developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1990) (SV
hereafter). The efficient market hypothesis suggests that horizons should not matter be-
cause a firm’s stock price is always equal to its fundamental value regardless of the horizons
of investments. Therefore, SV’s model assumes misvaluation: an underpricing of long-term
projects takes longer to be eliminated and hence long-term projects are exposed to more
noise trader risk than short-term projects. Then, the main prediction from the model is
that, to eliminate underpricing and realize their returns as soon as possible, short-term
investors funded by liabilities with short maturities prefer short-term investment projects
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even if long-term projects have higher fundamental values, which in turn, in equilibrium,
leads to larger mispricing for long-term projects funded mostly by short-term investors for
the costs of arbitrage for short-term and long-term projects to be equal. Then corporate
managers whose compensations are partly associated with short-run (stock) performance
would choose short-term projects because the stock price being underpriced for a long
period of time would hurt their payoffs or even threaten their jobs. This equilibrium short-
termism by investors and firms can be mitigated by long-term investors because long-term
projects funded by long-term investors would be less mispriced and hence corporate man-
agers would be able to keep pursuing long-term profitable projects without being distracted
by pressure for short-term performance.4
Furthermore, recent studies have shown that institutional investors influence corporate
policies such as governance choices (Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)) and payout policies
(Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016)). Also, Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013) and
Harford, Kecskes, and Mansi (2016) find that long-term institutional investors affect corpo-
rate governance and managerial misbehaviors as well as corporate policies such as invest-
ment and financing decisions. These studies all provide consistent evidence that investors
influence management through active monitoring and governance mechanisms. Therefore,
my empirical findings are consistent with a new hypothesis combining the aforementioned
prediction from SV’s model on investors’ horizon preferences and managerial short-termism
behaviors, and the recent empirical evidences on institutional investors as active owners:
in the presence of underpricing corporate managers would increase the horizons of their
firms’ real investments by reallocating capitals across divisions with different investment
horizons in response to an increase of long-term institutional ownership in their firms, be-
cause institutional investors with long investment horizons would prefer long-term more
valuable investment projects and hence try to mitigate the effect of speculative components
in stock prices on managers’ biased investment decisions toward short-term projects, subse-
quently resulting in greater overall economic values of corporate investments. Throughout
the paper, I call this hypothesis the horizon alignment hypothesis.
4The model implication by Shleifer and Vishny (1990) is consistent with a popular belief among prac-
titioners that long-term investment could be a good way to make profits even though it requires more
commitment with higher opportunity costs and takes longer to realize the returns, for example, “Numerous
market players concur with this view. For instance, CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement
System pension fund) published its 10 investment beliefs; among them is the belief that “a long term in-
vestment horizon is a responsibility and an advantage” that leads them to “favor investment strategies that
create long-term, sustainable value.”” (Roberge, Flaherty, Jr., Almeida, Jr., and Boyd (2016))
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While some related studies examine the effects of pressures by short-term investors on
managerial choices between short-term earnings management and investments in R&D or
tangible assets (e.g., Bushee (1998), Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), and Cremers,
Pareek, and Sautner (2016)), the effects of CEO contractual protection on those managerial
choices (e.g., Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang (2015)), the differential responsiveness to changes
in investment opportunities between publicly listed firms and privately held firms due to
short-termist pressures by stock markets (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015)), or
the effects of long-term investors on corporate investments and innovations (e.g. Harford,
Kecskes, and Mansi (2016)), yet has been attempted to measure the horizons of firms’
real investments and sort investments or innovations into short-term or long-term ones.
For the following reasons, it is critical to measure the horizons of real corporate invest-
ments, which have not been successful in the existing body of literature. First, the existing
amount-based measures of long-term investments such as capital expenditures or R&D ex-
penditures cannot tell anything about the actual horizons of the investment projects: it is
not always the case that longer-term projects require larger investments than shorter-term
projects. Therefore, an increase (decrease) in the amount of such investments cannot be
deemed as a lengthened (shortened) corporate investment horizon. Second, the short-term
earnings management, often used as a proxy for short-term investment projects, may be a
consequence of managers’ endogenous intentions to create mispricing. Therefore, compar-
ing short-term earnings management with R&D or capital expenditures cannot correctly
test the predictions from SV’s model that assumes the presence of mispricing.
This paper is related to the growing literature on managerial short-termism. Bebchuk
and Stole (1993) propose theoretical predictions that in the presence of imperfect informa-
tion managerial short-term objectives could lead to either underinvestment or overinvest-
ment depending on the characteristics of the imperfect information. Milbradt and Oehmke
(2015) develop a model predicting that higher cost of external financing for long-term
projects could induce managers to make inefficient investment decisions toward short-term
projects, thereby generating an equilibrium inefficient short-termism. On the other hand,
Thakor (2016) shows that short-termism could be an efficient decision in that it could limit
managerial rent-seeking behavior and reveal managerial ability faster. A recent empirical
study by Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015) documents an evidence of short-termism by
showing that private investments in cancer research are distorted away from long-term
projects due to the structure of the patent system where firms file patents at the time of
invention rather than commercialization. Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang (2015) also doc-
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ument an empirical evidence on the effect of CEO contractual protection on managerial
short-termism. My paper differs from these papers because I examine investor horizon
as the determinant of managerial horizon on investment decisions while others investigate
either consequences of short-termism or other factors such as financing frictions and CEO
contracts as the determinants of managerial investment horizons.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on the role of investor horizons in stock
markets and corporate policies. However, the previous studies in this literature investigate
the effects of investor horizons on variables other than corporate investment horizons: for
example, M&A deals and post-merger performance (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005)
and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)), amplification of negative shocks in the aftermath of
the financial crisis (Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2013)), catering behaviors by corporate
managers (Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)), CEO horizon incentives (Cadman and
Sunder (2014)), and investment choices by venture capitals on the life-cycles of innovative
firms (Barrot (2016)).
My paper differs from other papers that use quasi-indexed institutions as the source
of exogenous variation in institutional ownerships of firms. Unlike Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales (2013), Boone and White (2015), Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), Crane,
Michenaud, and Weston (2016) that use the index membership as an instrumental variable
for institutional ownership, it is long-term institutional ownership that I instrument by the
index membership. Basically though, what other papers actually instrument by the index
membership is also institutional ownership by long-term investors because quasi-indexers
are classified into long-term investors (Bushee (1998)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops the hypotheses.
Section 3.2 describes the data and the variables used in empirical tests. Section 1.4 reports
my empirical results from the baseline specifications. Section 1.5 presents the empirical
results with causal inference from an identification strategy. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Hypotheses Development
In this section, I develop hypotheses that I test using my data in this study. In short, I
extend and combine the implications from the model in Shleifer and Vishny (1990) (SV
hereafter again) and the well-documented empirical evidence in the literature.
Consider a conglomerate which consists of two divisions: a division that has a long-term
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project and the other division that has a short-term project. This firm dynamically adjust
the overall investment horizon at firm level by reallocating its capital across these two
divisions. Suppose there are three types of investors in the stock market: short-term smart
investors (arbitrageurs), long-term investors, and noise traders, which implicitly assumes
that the market is not perfectly efficient at least to some degree. I only consider the case of
underpricing here as the other case for overvaluation is symmetric.5 The key assumption
of SV’s model is that for short-term investors the cost of arbitrage is higher for long-term
investment projects than for short-term investment projects: both fundamental and noise
trader risks for short-term investors are more crucial for long-term projects of which the
elimination of underpricing takes longer because there is more time for negative news or
pessimism among investors to arrive, 6 and these risks cannot be completely shared in the
market because the existence of information asymmetry between short-term arbitrageurs
and outside lenders imposes credit constraints on short-term investors for borrowing rates,
amount, and maturities. Furthermore, due to such credit constraints, short-term investors
are additionally subject to opportunity costs of their capital being tied up for long-term
projects. In a related context, short-term investors might inherently have shorter maturities
of their liabilities from the beginning.7
Then the main implication on investors’ side from SV’s model due to this higher cost of
arbitrage and the resulting credit and maturity constraints imposed on short-term investors
is that, in order to eliminate underpricing sooner and realize their returns from arbitraging
as soon as possible, short-term arbitrageurs would prefer short-term projects even if long-
term projects have higher fundamental values.
In equilibrium, the returns to arbitrage on the long-term project and the short-term
project must be the same. Since the cost of arbitrage is greater for the long-term project,
short-term investors require the long-term project to be more underpriced. Then another
implication from SV’s model on the side of corporate managers is that the managers would
5As a matter of fact, the case of overvaluation is irrelevant to consider in this model framework because
both short-term and long-term investors would immediately liquidate their shares of undervalued firms,
hence they are not differentiated.
6‘Fundamental risk’ means that the fundamental value could actually fall before the completion of the
project and the elimination of the undervaluation. ‘Noise trader risk’ implies that the underpricing could
become even larger tomorrow than today, so investors would lose money if they liquidate their positions
tomorrow.
7“For example, pension funds have long-term liabilities and thus long investment horizons whereas
mutual funds are subject to large short-term redemptions and thus their investment horizons are also
short-term.” (Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013))
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choose the short-term less valuable- over the long-term more valuable investment project
because in practice the compensation of managers is in part linked to short-term equity
performance and hence the managers would want to avoid the stock price to be underpriced
for a long time. Therefore, long-term investors could mitigate such inefficient corporate
short-termisms, either through corporate manager’s observation of longer holding period by
equity investors, thereby being less pressured by short-run stock performance, or through a
lengthened managerial incentive horizon by activist shareholders with long-term investment
horizon affecting executive compensation structures. This leads to the following hypothesis:
• An increase in the long-term ownership of a conglomerate is followed by a lengthened
compensation horizon of the firm’s manager.
• Such increase in long-term ownership is subsequently followed by within-firm capital
reallocations from short-term less valuable to long-term more valuable investment
projects.
• Such capital reallocations result in an increase of the overall investment horizon as
well as the overall fundamental value of the firm.
• This horizon alignment effect is stronger for firms with greater undervaluation.
In what follows, I directly test these implications through a battery of empirical specifica-
tions. I first construct the measures of corporate investment horizon, the value of corporate
investment, managerial incentive horizon, and investor horizon. Then I show that the first
three measures are positively correlated with the measure of investor horizon, respectively.
I establish the causality of those positive relationships by instrumenting the long-term in-
stitutional ownership by its discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold
and show that the causal relationship is stronger for firms with greater undervaluation. I
also show that those effects are the consequences of within-firm capital reallocations.
1.3 Data and Variables
In this section, I describe how to construct the sample from various data sources, discuss
the main variables used in this study, and report summary statistics of them.
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1.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
The data for this study are compiled from several sources. Firm-level accounting informa-
tion is obtained from Compustat and data on stock come from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP). Divisional data for U.S. publicly listed firms are acquired from
Compustat Historical Segments Data. Patent data used to measure industry-level product
life-cycle lengths are collected from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Patent Citations Data file. Data on the dollar value of each patent are collected from
Noah Stoffman’s website on patent data.8 Grant-level data used to calculate the horizons
of performance-related CEO compensations are gathered from the Incentive Lab database.
Data on institutional common stock holdings are obtained from Thomson Reuters.
The sample construction starts at segment level by excluding all other types of segments
except business segments. For the sake of measuring product life-cycle length, I keep only
segments where patent data are available for their industries. I also drop segment-years
with missing values for capital expenditures or identifiable total assets. Then at firm level,
since I concentrate on U.S. conglomerates in this study, among all publicly traded U.S.
firms between 1990 and 2010 only those with at least two segments operating in differ-
ent industries are kept in the sample.9 I merge the resulting data file with annual firm
characteristics from Compustat. Finally, I merge these data with institutional ownership
data from Thomson Reuters and drop firm-year observations with missing values for insti-
tutional ownership. The final sample for baseline analyses consists of 6,619 firm-year and
21,170 segment-year observations.
1.3.2 Variables and Summary Statistics
1.3.2.1 Corporate Investment Horizons
One of the most challenging parts in empirically testing the horizon alignment hypotheses
is to measure corporate investment horizons. Two most critical features of such measure
to be desired are: 1) it should measure the actual time horizon of real investments because
8https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents
9Since companies typically look back three years and review all the information again when reporting
segments data, there are occasions that some already recorded entries are updated within three years. To
keep any unfinalized data from polluting the test results and to be as conservative as possible by having
safety margins, I exclude recent years from the sample.
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otherwise there would be no comparative advantage of using it compared to examining
managerial choices between short-term earnings management and spending on R&D, and
we would be unable to directly test the implications derived from Shleifer and Vishny’s
(1990) model; 2) it should measure ex ante required or expected time length for an invest-
ment to come to fruition at the moment of a managerial investment decision rather than ex
post actual time taken until the fruition of the investment because the question of interest
is whether investor horizons influence corporate investment decisions, not the outcome of
corporate investments.
To meet such desired features, I use an industry-level technology-based measure of prod-
uct life-cycle length as the proxy for investment time horizon of each industry. Following
Bilir (2014), I measure an industry’s product life-cycle length using the NBER Patent Ci-
tation Data as follows: 1) for each pair of cited and citing patents, I calculate the time
lapse between the cited patent’s grant date and the citing patent’s citation date, which is
called the forward citation lag by Bilir (2014); 2) for each patent, I compute the average of
the forward citation lags across all subsequent citing patents; 3) then for each three-digit
SIC industry, I collect all patents filed for the industry and pick the median of the average
forward citation lags which is the measure of product life-cycle length of that industry.
This product life-cycle length varies from approximately six to thirteen years across
industries. Table 1.2 reports the complete list of product life-cycle lengths for SIC three-
digit codes where at least 1,000 patents have been granted over the past forty years. For
example, the non-electric heating equipment industry is the one with the longest product
life-cycle of approximately thirteen years, and the electronic machinery industry is the one
with the shortest product life-cycle of approximately six years. What this industry-level
product life-cycle length actually measures is the economic lifetime of a patented technology
rather than that of a specific version of a product which a product turnover measure based
on product level data, if any, would proxy.10
This measure of industry-level product life-cycle length satisfies the two desired features
above of a corporate investment horizon measure. First, it measures the actual time horizon
in years rather than just whether a corporate decision is of short-term or long-term view.
10“As an illustration of this product definition, consider the example of automobiles. New car models
within an automobile product line are introduced annually (termed the “model cycle” in Bils 2009), but the
technological overlap across successive models is substantial... Successive versions of the Honda Accord,
for example, are so similar that the BLS substitutes new versions for old (e.g., the 2012 Honda Accord
LX is substituted for the 2011 Honda Accord LX, with minimal adjustment) to establish price comparisons
underlying official US inflation indexes (Bils 2009).”, Bilir (2014)
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Second and more importantly, it measures the ex ante required or expected time length
until an investment starts generating outcomes. Consider an example where there are two
industries, that is, one industry with a long product life-cycle of thirteen years and the
other industry with a short product life-cycle of six years. Then, on average, the thirteen-
year product life-cycle length implies that once a company achieves a patented technology
in this industry, it can expect a secured cash-flow-generating time period of thirteen years
while the six-year product life-cycle length means such time period of only six years. This
equivalently means that the company operating in the long product life-cycle industry can
have, on average, longer time for developing a new technology than companies operating
in the short product life-cycle industry.
To help better understand how this measure of product life-cycle length based only
on cross-sectional variations across industries is used for measuring corporate investment
horizons at firm-year level, consider again a diversified firm consisting of two segments
as exemplified in Section 1.2: a segment that operates in an industry with long product
life-cycle and the other segment that operates in another industry with short product
life-cycle.11 The product life-cycle length for each industry is exogenously given and time-
invariant. Each segment reports its own total assets which dynamically change every year.
Then the overall investment horizon of a conglomerate firm for each year is calculated as
the asset-weighted average of product life-cycle lengths across segments, that is, simply






Avg. PLC stands for average product life-cycle length. PLCj is the product life-cycle
length of the segment j’s industry and ATi,t denotes total assets of firm i for the year
t. iasj,t denotes identifiable total assets of segment j for the year t which is the main
11Among many other examples of such a diversified firm is Procter & Gamble Co. (P&G) which is a
U.S. multinational conglomerate giant manufacturing mainly cleaning agents and personal care products.
P&G largely has three major segments where patent data are available: one is its oldest and biggest home-
care segment that produces, for instance, dishwashing liquid and laundry detergent brands such as Dawn,
Tide, and Downy, of which industry has approximately eight years of short product life-cycle; another is the
health-care and pharmaceutical segment that produces, for example, cough and cold products such as Vicks
or medicines for minor digestive system upset such as Pepto-Bismol, whose industry has approximately ten
years of long product life-cycle; and the third is its grooming segment which was recently formed from the
acquisitions of Gillette and Braun that manufactures razors and blades of which industry has 11.69 years
of very-long product life-cycle.
12
source of cross-sectional and time-series variations in this firm-level corporate investment
horizon measure and changes every year as a result of within-firm capital allocations across
segments. Another source of time-series variations in the corporate investment horizon is
corporate restructuring such as mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, spin-offs, etc. which
occur infrequently though, hence is not closely examined in this paper.
1.3.2.2 Economic Value of Corporate Investment
Another challenging part in an empirical study on the horizon alignment hypotheses is
measuring the fundamental value of corporate investment. Successful execution on this
is critical because the horizon should not matter in the first place unless the long-term
investment projects have greater fundamental values than short-term projects. This task
is extremely difficult because researchers do not directly observe values of corporate invest-
ment projects.
Since my measure of corporate investment horizon is based on the industry-level inno-
vation activities, I also use the patent data to measure the values of corporate investment.
More specifically, I use the data on economic value of each patent that Kogan, Papaniko-
laou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) (KPSS hereafter) create in their recently published paper
using the announcement-day stock return of each patent. They develop a model that
derives the dollar value (deflated to 1982 dollars) of each patent implied from the stock
market reaction to the announcement of granting the patent. For each industry, I collect
all patents over the six-year period prior to each year and take the average of their KPSS
measures of economic value.12 Then for each conglomerate, I compute the asset-weighted
average of this industry-level patent economic value across all segments, which I define as
the firm’s economic value of investment.
It is worth noting that the patent economic value varies significantly across industries
and over time. In addition, at industry-level, the patent economic values of long prod-
uct life-cycle industries are not necessarily greater than those of short product life-cycle
industries. Furthermore, the overall ranking of industries in product life-cycle length and
patent economic value does not apply to within-firm rankings in the same manner. For
example, the SIC industry ‘367’ for ‘Electronic Components and Accessories’ has relatively
short product life-cycle length of 7.39 years and low average patent economic value of $9.65
12When measuring both corporate investment horizon and the value corporate investment, I use the
USPTO-SIC concordance to aggregate the USPTO-class-level data at each three-digit SIC.
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million in 1982 dollars. However, its product life-cycle length and average patent economic
value are long and high compared to the SIC industry ‘383’ for ‘Electronics Machinery’
which has product life-cycle length of 5.99 years and average patent economic value of
$1.6 million in 1982 dollars. Therefore, for a conglomerate operating in both industries,
the ‘Electronic Components and Accessories’ industry is deemed as a long-term valuable
industry. These together imply that I need a cross-sectional analysis to see whether long-
term investors influence managers to reallocate capitals toward divisions with long-term
profitable investment projects, instead of simply checking whether long-horizon industries
systematically have greater economic values of investments.
1.3.2.3 Managerial Incentive Horizon
To investigate whether long-term investors attempt to make any changes on a firm’s execu-
tive compensation structure so that the manager of the firm can pursue long-term profitable
investment projects without pressures for short-term performance, I explore grant-level
data on executive compensation collected from the Incentive Lab. In particular, I focus on
CEOs and performance-related incentive plans in their compensation packages to create
a firm-level measure of incentive horizon. A CEO’s compensation package consists of a
number of grants that vary in many dimensions such as the composition of performance
targets, vesting schedule, payment method, and so forth. Then each grant again comprises
multiple awards that vary in performance metric, evaluation period, payout structure, etc.
I first calculate the average vesting period (or performance evaluation period) for each
award and year. More specifically, I compute the exponentially-weighted average of vesting
months between the start and the end of the award vesting period, i.e.,









Mn is the nth month between the start month and the end month of the award vesting
period. For example, if the start month and the end month of an award are 12th month and
36th month, respectively, 6th month is the 17th month. h denotes the half-life that makes
the month that lie h months in the past weigh half as much as the end month. I choose
the half life of 6 month assuming that managers would care more about the performance
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goal as the end of vesting period approaches and they especially would do so most during
the last 6 months.13
Then at grant level, I compute the value-weighted average of vesting period across all
awards in a grant for each year. And finally, I again compute the value-weighted average
of this grant-level vesting period across all grants in a compensation package for a CEO,
which is my firm-level measure of managerial incentive horizon in months. This measure
captures the average time period over which the firm performance is evaluated and hence
likely how far in the future a manager whose incentives are tied to the firm performance
would care about the success of the firm’s investment projects.
1.3.2.4 Long-term Institutional Ownership
The main explanatory variable of interest in this study is investor horizon. This paper
focuses on investment horizons of institutional investors because their ownerships in stocks
have been increased over time, especially more in recent years, and so has been the impor-
tance of institutional investors.14 Many ways to measure investor horizons of institutional
investors have been introduced in the literature. Among others, there are two most recently
introduced approaches to measure investor horizon: the first one is the measure based on
portfolio turnover by institutional investors (e.g., Bushee (1998), Barber and Odean (2000),
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), Polk and Sapienza (2009), and Derrien, Kecskes, and
Thesmar (2013)), and the other one is the measure based on stock holding duration (Cre-
mers, Pareek, and Sautner (2016)). The main difference between these two approaches is
that the former aggregates all stock holdings at the investor level first and then aggregates
the investors at the stock level while the latter only aggregates investors at the stock level
without an aggregation at the investor level. This difference enables the latter to look into
the holding duration of each stock in an investor’s portfolio and allow any investor to be
short-term in some stocks and long-term in others, while making the former focus more on
the trading patterns of the investor over all stocks in her portfolio. Since both measures of
investor horizon have their own pros and cons, one needs to carefully pick a measure that
best fits the research design.
For the best interest of the research design in this paper, I choose the turnover-based
13When I pick other choices of the half life such as 9 month or 12 month, the results remain largely the
same.
14See Figure 1 in Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2016).
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ownership measure over the stock duration measure. First, the ownership measure based
on share turnovers works better for the identification strategy in the later section based on
discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold. The exclusion restriction for
the IV-2SLS estimations using this identification strategy is based on passive investments
by quasi-indexers who do not have controls over the selection of stocks in their portfolios.
While it is straightforward that the indexing by long-term quasi-indexers should lead to
discontinuity in long-term institutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold
because stocks in Russell indexes are ranked based solely on market capitalizations and
those on the top of Russell 2000 are assigned sharply greater index weights than those
on the bottom of Russell 1000, it is not clear whether such passive indexing should lead
to discontinuity in stock duration of firms around the threshold for the following reasons:
there could exist short-term indexers as well, at least to some degree, and stocks that are
newly added to Russell 2000 are indeed subject to a reduction rather than an increase in
stock duration because they happen to be just included in an indexer’s portfolio.15
Second, long-term institutional ownership measure fits better the focus of this study, that
is, the role of long-term institutional investors as owners of firms rather than arbitrageurs.
The main interest of this study is whether monitoring by long-term institutional investors
alleviates the negative effect of underpricing on corporate investment horizon, that is,
the amplification of short-termism that pressures corporate managers to forgo long-term
profitable projects. Stock duration measure is not ideal for this purpose because it tells
us little about inherent characteristics of each institutional investor and hence we cannot
judge whether any empirical results come from actual intentions of the investors.
To measure long-term institutional ownership at firm level, I follow Derrien, Kecskes,
and Thesmar (2013).16 Using the quarterly data from 13F filings on institutional holdings,
I first look back three years, i.e., twelve quarters, and calculate portfolio turnover for
each institutional investor, which is the fraction of shares that are no longer held after
three years of their purchases. For a given quarter, I compute the mean of this portfolio
turnover during the most recent four quarters to keep one extreme quarter from distorting
15As a matter of fact, it is extremely challenging to justify the use of stock duration measure as an
exogenous variable in any empirical studies. An investor’s decision on the duration of holding a specific stock
is fully endogenous and stock duration dynamically varies at investor-stock level. Due to this endogeneity
and the complexity in the source of variations, it has been unsuccessful in the literature to come up with
an identification strategy that explores exogenous variations in the stock duration.
16For the complete procedure to measure long-term institutional ownership step by step, refer to Section
3.B of Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013).
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the portfolio turnover. Then I classify each institutional investor as long-term or short-term
investor depending on whether the portfolio turnover is less or greater than 35% (cf. Froot,
Perold, and Stein (1992)). Finally, for each firm and for a given quarter, I calculate the
fraction of shares held by the long-term institutional investors out of the firm’s total shares
outstanding to come up with the measure of long-term institutional ownership at firm
level. Short-term institutional ownership, by construction, can be obtained by subtracting
long-term institutional ownership from total institutional ownership of a firm.
The investor-level portfolio turnover represents an investor characteristic, that is, the
average turnover across all shares in an institutional investor’s portfolio, by looking upon
the portfolio as a bundle instead of separately looking into each stock in the portfolio.
And Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013) show that this investor portfolio turnover is
stable over time17: each quarter, they sort all institutional investors whose holdings data
are available from 13F filings into quartiles based on their portfolio turnovers, calculate
the mean portfolio turnovers over the following quarters up to five years, and show that
investors remain in their original quartiles over all twenty quarters, which means that short-
term investors stay short-term and long-term investors stay long-term over time, and there
is no such dramatic conversion that short-term investors become long-term or vice versa.
Therefore, the long-term institutional ownership measure based on the investor portfolio
turnover implicitly regards institutional investors as having time-invariant investment hori-
zons regardless of which stocks they hold, and this feature is what makes it possible to
examine the role and effect of long-term institutional investors while the measure does not
separately look into holding duration of each stock in their portfolios.
1.3.2.5 Other Variables and Summary Statistics
The definitions of other firm-level variables used in the baseline specifications are as follows.
Total institutional ownership (Institutional ownership) is defined as the sum of shares held
by institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. Blockholder ownership (Block
ownership) is defined as the sum of shares held by institutional investors with an ownership
stake of greater than or equal to 5%. Sales growth (Sales growth) is the sales growth rate,
which is defined as sales minus lagged sales divided by lagged sales. Cash flow (Cash flow)
is earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation divided by total assets. Leverage
17See Figure 1 in the paper.
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(Debt) equals total debt over total assets. Firm size (Size) is equal to the natural logarithm
of total assets. Tobin’s Q (Q) is total assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity over total assets. Investment (Investment) is defined as capital expenditure over
total assets and R&D expenditure (R&D) is defined as research and development expense
divided by total assets. The segment-level cash flow is defined in a slightly different manner
as operating profit over total segment assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels in all analyses.
Table 1.3 summarizes both the firm-level (Panel A) and the segment-level (Panel B) data
for the sample periods (1990 to 2010) used in my analyses. The mean average product life-
cycle (PLC) length at firm level is 9.64 years with the standard deviation of 1.44 years.
Long-term institutional ownership is 32.3% on average with the standard deviation of
22.6% and total institutional ownership is 47.2% on average with the standard deviation of
32.1%. It can be observed by comparing with those reported in other work measuring long-
term ownership from 13F institutional holding data (e.g., Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar
(2013)) that the sample means of long-term ownership and institutional ownership in this
paper are greater, which indicates that institutional investors, especially those with long
investment horizons, are on average more likely to hold stocks of diversified conglomerates.
1.4 Baseline Results
To examine the relationship between investor horizon and corporate investment horizon, I
estimate the following firm-level baseline specification using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions:
AveragePLCLengthi,t = α+ βLong-termOwnershipi,t−1
+ γInstitutionalOwnershipi,t−1 + η
′ · Xi,t−1 + ϕi + τt + εi,t
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, X is a vector of control variables based on firm
characteristics, ϕi denotes firm fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant firm
heterogeneity, and τt denotes year fixed effects to control for unobserved market-wide shocks
for each year. To minimize the risk of simultaneity to bias our estimation results, all
explanatory variables lag the data on average product life-cycle length by one year. The
coefficient of interest here is β which estimates the marginal changes in the average product
18
life-cycle length in years in response to a one-unit increment in long-term institutional
ownership. To solely focus on the effect of investor horizon, total institutional ownership
is included in all specifications.
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.4, columns (1) and (2). Consistent with
the primary implication of the horizon alignment hypothesis developed in Section 1.2,
I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between long-term institutional
ownership and corporate investment horizon proxied by average product life-cycle length.
For example, in column (2) with both firm and year fixed effects, given that the sample
standard deviation of long-term institutional ownership is 23%, a one-standard-deviation
increase in long-term institutional ownership is associated with an increase in average
product life-cycle length of 0.715 years which is approximately eight months and two weeks.
This effect is economically significant as it is approximately 49.8% of the standard deviation
of average product life-cycle length.
To investigate the relationship between investor horizon and the value of corporate in-
vestments, I repeat the baseline analyses replacing the average product life-cycle length
with the average patent economic value (Average PEV ) as the dependent variable. Table
1.4, columns (3) and (4) report the results that are largely consistent with the horizon
alignment hypothesis. The coefficient on the long-term ownership is positive and statis-
tically significant in all specifications, which suggests that an increase in long-term own-
ership is followed by greater value of overall corporate investment in the following year.
For instance, in column (4), a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term institutional
ownership is associated with an increase in the average patent economic value by 4.7%.
Again, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on institutional ownership sup-
ports the short-termism implication of the horizon alignment hypothesis that short-term
investors put pressures on manager’s investment decisions toward short-term even if it is
value-destroying.
As I derive in Section 1.2, the horizon alignment hypothesis suggests the incentive plan
channel through which long-term investors can influence managers of conglomerates in
making investment decisions (or capital reallocation decisions) across segments with dif-
ferent horizons. To discover this channel, I repeat the baseline analyses, but now with
the measure of managerial incentive horizon, i.e., the average CEO grant vesting period
(Average CGV period) as the dependent variable.
The results from the OLS regressions are reported in Table 1.4, columns (5) and (6).
The coefficient of interest on long-term ownership is positive and statistically significant
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in all columns. These results provide support for the incentive plan channel. For example,
in column (6), a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term institutional ownership is
associated with an increase in the average CEO grant vesting period by four months and
two weeks. This effect is also economically significant as it is approximately 53% of the
standard deviation of the average CEO grant vesting period.
1.5 Identification
The positive relationships documented in Section 1.4, between investor horizon and cor-
porate investment horizon, corporate investment value, and managerial incentive horizon,
are consistent with the implications of the horizon alignment hypothesis. However, this
evidence from the estimations using OLS regressions on large panel data is subject to
endogeneity that there may be omitted variables that affect both long-term institutional
ownership and corporate investment horizon, which would bias my estimates. Among
many others, for example, simultaneity is one of the most severe concerns because long-
term institutional investors may self-select stocks with long and more valuable investment
projects, which should result in the same empirical evidence above. Addressing this en-
dogeneity concern is critical for the contribution of this study because one of the most
important implications in the horizon alignment hypothesis developed in Section 1.2 is
that investor horizons have causal effects on corporate managerial decisions on the horizon
of real investments.
This section discusses an identification strategy which is a 2SLS approach based on
an instrumental variable, the Russell 2000 index membership within a narrow bandwidth
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and documents evidence on the causality of the
results found earlier in Section 1.4 as well as on monitoring and governance channel behind
the causal relationship. It also discusses, through a cross-sectional analysis, the higher
profitabilities of long-horizon investment projects pursued by long-term institutional in-
vestors.
To implement the identification strategy discussed in this section, I construct a subsample
of U.S. conglomerates ranked near the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. The annual Russell
index constituents data are provided by Russell. Since I concentrate on firms around the
threshold, I merge my original sample of U.S. conglomerate firms with the Russell data
and confine the sample firms to those ranked within the bandwidth of 100 centered on
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the index threshold, that is, firms ranked between 991 and 1100. Following the literature,
I end the sample period in 2006 because Russell started applying the banding policy on
their index assignments since 2007 (Boone and White (2015), Appel, Gormley, and Keim
(2016), and Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016)).18 The resulting subsample consists
of 319 firm-year observations.
1.5.1 Discontinuity in Long-term Ownership around the Russell 1000/2000
Threshold
To address the aforementioned endogeneity concern and establish causal inference of the
evidence documented so far, I employ an identification strategy based on sharp disconti-
nuity in long-term institutional ownership around the threshold between the Russell 1000
and 2000 indexes. The Russell indexes are reconstituted each year mechanically based on
stock prices as of the last trading day of May: the largest three thousand stocks are ranked
based on their market capitalizations from rank 1 to rank 3000, and the first one thousand
stocks are assigned to the Russell 1000 index (Russell 1000) and the following two thousand
stocks are assigned to the Russell 2000 index (Russell 2000). Within each index, stocks
are assigned their index portfolio weights based on this market capitalization ranking. As
a result, the firms whose stocks are on the top of Russell 2000 have drastically larger index
weights than those whose stocks are on the bottom of Russell 1000. Since the Russell in-
dexes are among the most popular benchmarks that are tracked by the funds operated by
quasi-indexing institutional investors19 who are also classified as long-term investors based
on the definition of the measure of long-term institutional ownership used here, long-term
institutional ownerships are sharply higher for the firms on the top of Russell 2000 than
those on the bottom of Russell 1000.
Figure 1.1 graphically shows the discontinuity in long-term institutional ownership around
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. In this figure, I plot the average long-term institutional
ownership over stocks in each bin of ten ranks across all years between 1990 and 2006,
against the distance from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold which is defined as the actual
18For the sake of reducing the index turnover cost, they now make some non-mechanical adjustments to
keep consistency in their indexes when the market capitalizations of firms around the threshold are not
significant.
19The Russell 2000 index is the most widely adopted benchmark for small cap stocks while the Russell
1000 index is less commonly benchmarked because it competes against other popular indexes for large and
mid caps stocks such as the S&P 500, S&P 400, the CRSP U.S. midcap index, etc.
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Russell rank minus 1000.20 For example, the distance from the threshold of the 999th
ranked stock is -1, and that of the 1001st ranked stock is 1. It shows that long-term
institutional ownership is increasing in market capitalization, but at the threshold, firms
with slightly less market capitalizations have much higher long-term institutional owner-
ship. This discontinuity indicates that, within a narrow bandwidth of firms around the
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, the Russell 2000 membership has a clear and strong impact
on long-term institutional ownership. Nevertheless, such discontinuity alone cannot fully
qualify the Russell 2000 membership as an instrumental variable for long-term institutional
ownership. This naturally leads to the next issue.
1.5.2 The Exclusion Restriction
Despite the sharp discontinuity in long-term institutional ownership around the Russell
1000/2000 threshold, another condition must be met for the Russell 2000 membership to
be used as an instrumental variable - the exclusion restriction. In other words, the Russell
2000 membership must be exogenous to corporate investment horizon, except through its
effect on the long-term institutional ownership.
It is the local continuity in potential outcomes around the threshold that enables this
identifying assumption to be plausible: other than for the long-term institutional owner-
ship, firms on the bottom of Russell 1000 are similar to those on the top of Russell 2000,
hence on average there would have been no difference in potential outcomes including
corporate investment horizon between the two groups in the absence of the discontinuity
in index weights and long-term ownership. This is a reasonable assumption because the
index assignments by Russell are completely mechanical as explained earlier in the previ-
ous section, and there is no reason to expect systematic and sharp differences in potential
outcomes around the threshold.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly test the exclusion restriction using the existing
data. I, however, perform a robustness check through an investigation into pretreatment
effects to further support the plausibility of the exclusion restriction (Angrist and Pischke
(2009)). Any observed pretreatment effects of the Russell 2000 membership on firm char-
acteristics including corporate investment horizon would potentially imply the existence of
omitted variables or sample selection bias. Specifically, by regressing the lagged variables
20For this graph, I use the sample of all U.S. public firms instead of conglomerates only.
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on the Russell 2000 membership dummy for the firms ranked within a narrow bandwidth
around the threshold, I estimate the mean differences in the main explanatory variable,
i.e., the long-term institutional ownership and the dependent variable, i.e., the average
product life-cycle length as well as other firm characteristics in the year prior to the index
assignment between firms slightly above the threshold and those slightly below the thresh-
old. Table 1.5 presents the results. Each cell of the table reports the estimated coefficient
on the Russell 2000 membership dummy from each OLS regression and its t-statistic in
the parenthesis. Each column corresponds to the pre-treatment firm characteristic exam-
ined in each regression and each row corresponds to the bandwidth of firms used in each
regression. The results largely show that no significant differences are observed in various
potential outcomes and other firm characteristics between firms slightly above and below
the index cutoff, which supports the plausibility of the local continuity assumption around
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and subsequently the exclusion restriction as well.
Therefore, the sharp discontinuity between the firms on the bottom of Russell 1000 and
those on the top of Russell 2000 exists only on long-term institutional ownership21, which
motivates the use of the IV-2SLS approach.
1.5.3 IV-2SLS Estimations
Based on the mechanical index assignments by Russell and the pretreatment analysis, it
can be reasonably assumed that the discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold
is present only on index weights and eventually on long-term institutional ownership, which
subsequently implies that the Russell 2000 membership only affects long-term institutional
ownership while it is not correlated with any other factors that may influence corporate
investment horizon in a narrow bandwidth around the threshold. Therefore, using a dummy
variable for the assignment to the Russell 2000 index as an instrumental variable for the
long-term institutional ownership, I estimate the following two-stage least square (2SLS)
specification:
LTOi,t = α+ δ1STOi,t + δ2Russell2000i,t + δ3(Rank*i,t − 1000)
+ δ4Russell2000i,t(Rank*i,t − 1000) + δ5FloatAdji,t + τt + εi,t
21Note that the discontinuity in long-term institutional ownership originates from the mechanical discon-
tinuity in index weights.
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AveragePLCLengthi,t = θ + β0 ˆLTOi,t + β1STOi,t + β2(Rank*i,t − 1000)
+ β3Russell2000i,t(Rank*i,t − 1000) + β4FloatAdji,t + ςt + νi,t.
Russell2000 is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to Russell 2000 in a
given year t. Rank∗ is the rank of the firm based on market capitalization as of the last
trading day in May each year, and Rank∗−1000 represents the rank distance from the index
threshold. Both the rank distance, Rank ∗−1000, and its interaction with the Russell 2000
dummy, Russell2000×Rank ∗ −1000, are included to control for any size-related effects
and to focus on the variation near the threshold. FloatAdj is the difference between the
market capitalization-based rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell. I follow previous
studies exploring the same discontinuity around the Russell index cutoff and include this
variable to control for the variation in index weights attributed to non-mechanical float
adjustments made by Russell on the last day of June (e.g., Appel, Gormley, and Keim
(2016) and Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016)).22 The coefficient of interest is β0
which estimates the marginal changes in average product life-cycle length in response to a
one-unit increase in the instrumented long-term institutional ownership.
The results from the first-stage regression reported in Table 1.6, columns (1) and (2)
(columns (3) and (4)), formalize the sharp discontinuity in long-term (block) institutional
ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold described in Section 1.5.1.23 The posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficients on the dummy variable, Russell2000, indicate
that, on average, firms slightly below the threshold exhibit sharply larger long-term insti-
tutional ownership than those slightly above the threshold. For instance, in column (2),
the mean long-term institutional ownership is 13.07% higher for the firms on the top of
Russell 2000 than for the firms on the bottom of Russell 1000. This mean difference is
economically significant as it is approximately 66% of the standard deviation and 24%
of the average of long-term institutional ownership over the subsample firms used in the
identification specifications. Thus, for firms within a narrow bandwidth around the thresh-
old, the Russell 2000 membership has a strong positive impact on long-term institutional
22Russell’s float calculation to determine the market capitalizations of firms to be used for assigning the
index weights is unobservable to researchers. It is mostly about determining which price to be used in case
of multiple share classes. However, it does not invalidate any empirical designs including mine because the
Russell index memberships can be observed by researchers and the variation in index weights caused by
the Russell’s undisclosed float calculations can be controlled by the actual ranks assigned by Russell which
is also observable to researchers.
23I report the discontinuity in long-term and block institutional ownership for an additional test on the
effect of long-term investors with potentially more intervenient power.
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ownership.
Table 1.7 presents the results from the second stage regressions of the average product
life-cycle length, the average patent economic value, and the average CEO’s grant vesting
period, respectively in columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), on the instrumented long-
term institutional ownership predicted from the first-stage regression. The results in all
specifications confirm that the positive relationships documented in Section 1.4 are causal,
that is, an increase of long-term institutional ownership causes the corporate investment
horizon, the value of corporate investment, and managerial incentive horizon to increase.
The estimated coefficient 3.2568 in column (2) implies that, in the small bandwidth of
±100, a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term institutional ownership due to the
index assignment to Russell 2000 leads to an increase in average product life-cycle length by
0.565 years which is approximately six months and three weeks. This effect is economically
significant as it is approximately 54% of the standard deviation of the average product
life-cycle length. In addition, the coefficient estimates in columns (4) and (6), respectively,
indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term ownership due to the index
assignment to Russell 2000 results in a 4.1%-increase in the average patent economic value
and a longer average CEO’s grant vesting period by three months and two weeks.
In sum, the estimation results from IV-2SLS regressions here establish the causality of
the evidence of the horizon alignment hypothesis documented through the baseline analysis
in Section 1.4, which can be interpreted as an increased long-term institutional ownership
causing firms to increase their investment horizons and values as well as managerial incen-
tive horizons.
1.5.4 Horizon Alignment and Mispricing
To test another implication from the horizon alignment hypothesis that underpricing is the
main driving force of the horizon alignment effect and hence the effects documented earlier
are more pronounced for highly undervalued firms, I divide the sample into above-median-
and below-median-undervaluation groups based on some proxies for undervaluation and
conduct the IV-2SLS regressions separately for each subsample.
To measure the degree of undervaluation, I use four different proxies introduced in the lit-
erature: residual book-to-market ratio by regressing book-to-market on firm age, dividend
payment dummy, leverage, size, return volatility, and return on equity (ROE) for each
year (Pástor and Veronesi (2003)), residual book-to-market ratio by regressing book-to-
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market on size, ROE if positive, ROE if negative, and leverage for each industry and each
year (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)), future excess returns (Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009)), and raw book-to-market ratio
(Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)). The first two proxies based on residual book-
to-market capture the deviation of the observed book-to-market ratio from the (expected)
fundamental book-to-market ratio. Future excess return captures price correction in the
future conditional on current misvaluation. The use of raw book-to-market is motivated by
the purpose of capturing not only firm-specific relative mispricing but also industry-wide
or market-wide absolute mispricing. For all these proxies for mispricing, the greater the
value is, the more the firm is undervalued.24
Table 1.8 presents the estimation results for this cross-sectional analysis. Columns (1)-
(2), (3)-(4), (5)-(6), and (7)-(8) report the results using the Pástor and Veronesi (2003)
residual book-to-market, the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) residual
book-to-market, future excess returns, and raw book-to-market as the proxy for mispricing,
respectively. The estimated coefficients from 2SLS regressions of each dependent variable
- average product life-cycle length, average patent economic value, and average CEO’s
grant vesting period, on the long-term institutional ownership instrumented by Russell
2000 index membership are reported. In all specifications for the subsamples with above-
median degrees of undervaluation, I find positive and statistically significant coefficients
on the instrumented long-term ownership. The effects are economically substantial. For
instance, in column (2) with average product life-cycle length as the dependent variable
using the Pástor and Veronesi (2003) undervaluation proxy, given that the sample standard
deviation of long-term institutional ownership is 17.4%, a one-standard-deviation increase
in long-term institutional ownership is followed by an increase in average product life-
cycle length of 0.607 years which is seven months and one week. It is approximately 57%
of the standard deviation of average product life-cycle length. On the other hand, for the
subsamples of firms with below-median degrees of undervaluation, the estimated coefficients
are much smaller in magnitude or are not statistically significant. The evidence from
this cross-sectional analysis implies that the effects of long-term ownership on corporate
investment horizon, the value of corporate investment, and managerial incentive horizon
are stronger for highly undervalued firms, which is consistent with the horizon alignment
hypothesis developed in Section 1.2.
24To save space, I refer the reader to each paper for the details of estimating each proxy.
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1.5.5 Investment Horizon and Capital Allocations
To investigate the capital allocation channel for the adjustment of corporate investment
horizon in response to an increase in long-term institutional ownership, I estimate the
following segment-level IV-2SLS specification:
LTOi,t = α+ δ1STOi,t + δ2Russell2000i,t + δ3(Rank*i,t − 1000)
+ δ4Russell2000i,t(Rank*i,t − 1000) + δ5FloatAdji,t + τt + εi,t
INVi,j,t = θ + β0 ˆLTOi,t + β1LongPLCi,j + β2LTOi,t−1 × LongPLCi,j + γ1STOi,t
+ γ2(Rank*i,t − 1000) + γ3Russell2000i,t(Rank*i,t − 1000) + γ4FloatAdji,t
+ ψi,k + ςt + νi,j,t.
where i indexes firms, j indexes segments, k indexes industries, t indexes years, INV
is segment investment, which is capital expenditures of a segment over its identifiable
total assets, LongPLC is a dummy variable that equals one if the segment operates in
an industry with above-median product life-cycle length, ςt is year fixed effect, and ψk,t
denotes industry-firm fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry-
firm level.25 The coefficients of interest in this segment-level specification are β0 and
β0+β2 which estimate the marginal effects of the firm’s long-term institutional ownership
on the segment’s investment if the segment’s industry has short and long product life-cycles,
respectively.
The results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.9. In both regressions, the
coefficient on long-term institutional ownership (β0) is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that segments with short product life-cycles reduce their investments in
physical assets in response to an increase in long-term ownership of their firms. On the
other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term (β2) is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Combining these two coefficients, i.e., by β0+β2, I find that an increase in long-term
institutional ownership of a firm is followed by an increase in investments for long prod-
uct life-cycle segments. For example, the coefficient of -0.0072 on long-term ownership
25Segment fixed effects cannot be included because Compustat Segment Data File does not provide
a unique segment identifier across time. Firm fixed effects cannot be included either because it is not
guaranteed that a firm is included in the sample in consecutive years within a narrow band-width around
the index cutoff.
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in column (2) indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term institutional
ownership is associated with a reduction in capital expenditures of approximately 1.6%
of total assets for short product life-cycle segments, which is approximately $2.14 million
cut on average given that the sample mean of segment assets is $134 million. The sum of
the two coefficients on long-term ownership and the interaction term, -0.0072 + 0.0086 =
0.0014, indicates that for long product life-cycle segments a one-standard-deviation increase
in long-term institutional ownership is associated with an increase in capital expenditures
of approximately 0.32% of segment assets, which is approximately $428,800 raise on av-
erage.26 The economic magnitudes of this differential effect for short and long product
life-cycle segments are significant. The coefficient of 0.0086 on the interaction term implies
difference in capital expenditures of approximately 1.95% of segment assets in response to
a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term ownership, and this is nearly 34% of the
standard deviation of segment investment.
To additionally examine whether these capital reallocations are made toward long-term
and profitable segments, I execute cross-sectional analyses by interacting the aforemen-
tioned segment-level specification with another indicator variable for segments with greater
values of investment projects, i.e., High PEV, which is defined as a dummy variable equal
to one if the patent economic value of the segment’s industry is above-median among all
segments within the firm. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.9. In
both specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term, LTO×LongPLC×HighPEV ,
is positive and statistically significant, which implies that the documented capital reallo-
cation effect of long-term ownership toward long-term segments in columns (1) and (2) is
more pronounced among segments with high value of investment projects. Together with
the negative and statistically significant coefficient on long-term ownership (LTO), this
result shows that firms reallocate their capital from short-term and less profitable seg-
ments to longer-term and more profitable segments in response to an increase in long-term
institutional ownership.
Overall, the results in this segment-level analysis suggest that, when there is an increase
in long-term institutional ownership, conglomerate firms reallocate their capital toward seg-
ments with long-term profitable investment projects, which is consistent with the horizon
alignment hypothesis.
26It is worth noting that the overall decline in investments following an increase in long-term institutional
ownership at the firm level found here is consistent with the evidence documented in Harford, Kecskes, and
Mansi (2016).
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1.5.6 The Horizon Alignment through Long-term Block-holders
As mentioned earlier, the literature has evolved to look at institutional investors as the
owners of firms rather than just trading agencies. Investors holding a large block of shares
of a firm likely have more influence on the firm’s choice of investment projects either
because the firm’s manager might observe changes in ownership by those investors thereby
modifying the firm’s investment policies due to tightened or relaxed pressures for short-run
stock performance, or because the block shareholders are active enough to participate in
the firm’s board meetings and directly influence the firm’s investment decisions or try to
indirectly affect the corporate investment policies by voting for the changes in executive
compensation structures.
To examine whether long-term investors with likely more intervenient power are more
influential for the changes in managerial incentive horizon and a firm’s choices of investment
projects, I calculate the ownership by long-term institutional investors who own 5% or more
of total shares of the firm. Then I repeat the same 2SLS regressions in section 1.5.3 replacing
long-term ownership with this long-term block ownership. Many studies have shown that
block shareholders in general indeed influence management and corporate policies (e.g.,
Holderness (2003), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), and
Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011)). In addition, Brav et al. (2008) and Brav,
Jiang, and Kim (2015) find that 13D filings by activist hedge funds with a large stake lead
to higher firm value as well as improved firm-level operating performance and plant-level
productivity.27 Thus, a positive coefficient on long-term block ownership would support
the aforementioned arguments on the potential channels through which long-term investors
influence firms’ investment project choices.
The estimation results from the 2SLS specifications on long-term block ownership are
presented in Table 1.10. The positive coefficients on the instrumented long-term block insti-
tutional ownership are both statistically and economically significant in all specifications.
In column (2) for example, with the average product life-cycle length as the dependent
variable, a one-standard-deviation increase in long-term institutional ownership due to the
index assignment to Russell 2000 leads to an increase in average product life-cycle length by
0.376 years which is approximately four months and two weeks. These results strengthen
the plausibility of the documented causal horizon alignment effects.
27Edmans (2014) reviews theoretical papers as well as other empirical papers supporting this view on
block shareholders as active monitors rather than passive traders.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effect of investment horizons by institutional investors on the
horizons of firms’ real investments. A battery of analyses looking into institutional hold-
ings and patent citation data provides strong empirical evidence that, in the presence of
mispricing, an increase in long-term institutional ownership leads to a lengthened aver-
age product life-cycle length of U.S. conglomerate firms. This evidence can be interpreted
that, when a stock price of a firm deviates from its fundamental value, the firm increases its
corporate investment horizon in response to an inflow of long-term institutional investors
as the firm’s equity shareholders because it alleviates the equilibrium short-termism by
credit- and maturity-constrained short-term arbitrageurs and firms that compensate their
managers partly for short-term stock performance.
As a baseline estimation result using a large panel data set, I find a positive relationship
between long-term institutional ownership and the average product life-cycle length. This
relationship is stronger for firms with greater mispricing, which confirms that this horizon
alignment comes from the alleviation of short-term investors’ arbitrage-seeking behaviors.
A plant-level analysis reveals the within-conglomerate capital reallocation channel behind
this horizon alignment. To establish the causality of this baseline relationship, I exploit
the firms in a narrow bandwidth around the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold and instru-
ment long-term institutional ownership by the Russell 2000 membership dummy variable
based on the sharp discontinuity in long-term ownership around the threshold which is
not related to factors that may affect corporate investment horizons. Then, executing
IV-2SLS regressions, I document the causal evidence that long-term institutional investors
have positive influences on firms’ average product life-cycle lengths through governance
mechanisms such as large stake holdings or shareholder rights protection. Finally, as an
indirect evidence of the higher fundamental value of long-term investment projects, I find
that the short-run performance following an increase in long-term institutional ownership
is higher for firms with long product life-cycle than for those with short product life-cycle.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to show that investor horizons affect
the horizons of firms’ real investments and that there exists horizon alignment between
investors and firms. Some previous studies in the literature have already shown that the
existence of short-term investors pressures managers to cut R&D spending to boost short-
term earnings and thereby short-term stock prices in the spirit of, for example, Bolton,
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) (e.g., Bushee (1998) and Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner
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(2016)). However, while they compare the really-short-term earnings management versus
overall investments in tangible or intangible assets regardless of their horizons, in this paper
I compare real investments in short-term projects versus long-term projects.
This study also sheds light on the role of long-term institutional investors as owners of
firms. In particular, the findings in this paper strengthen the view that lengthening investor
horizons can mitigate short-termism problems prevailing among U.S. firms and help them
pursue more productive long-term investment projects. Moreover, a further evidence that
this effect is more pronounced among firms with large blockholder ownerships possibly
opposes the argument that short-termism problems can be resolved by investors holding
large stakes of the firms without having to induce investors to lengthen their investment
horizons (e.g., Edmans (2015)). A compromised view, which is actually the key takeaway
from this study, could be that it is the blockholders with long-term investment horizon
who can help corporate managers pursue more profitable long-term investment projects
without being distracted.
In this spirit, the evidence documented here also has a policy implication that regulations
which would discourage short-term trading behaviors by investors could be a remedy to
the prevalent short-termism among U.S. corporations, especially in the context of biased
managerial decisions toward investment projects with shorter horizon. This implication
in turn supports the recent moves by politicians and regulators such as the tax reforms
proposed by Hilary Clinton in 2015.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1 Long-term Ownership around Russell 1000/2000 Threshold
This figure plots the long-term institutional ownership for the third quarter against the rank distance
from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold during 1990-2005, within a narrow bandwidth around the threshold.
The stocks are sorted into each bin of ten ranks, and for each bin the long-term institutional ownerships
are averaged across all years (y-axis). The distances from threshold are calculated using the actual ranks
assigned by Russell (x -axis).
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Table 1.1 Variable Definitions
Average PLC length The asset-weighted average of industry-level product life-
cycle length across all business segments of a publicly listed
U.S. conglomerate firm. The product life-cycle length is
calculated as the industry median of the patent-level av-
erage forward citation lag where the average forward cita-
tion lag is the average of the time lapse between the cited
patent’s grant date and a subsequent citation across all cit-
ing patents. For the details of the calculation of the average
forward citation lag, see Bilir (2014).
Average PEV The asset-weighted average of industry-level economic value
of patents across all business segments of a publicly listed
U.S. conglomerate firm. The economic value of patents for
each industry is calculated as the average of the Kogan,
Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman’s (2017) announcement-
return-based measure across all patents in the industry over
the six-year-period prior to each year.
Ln(Average PEV) Natural lograithm of Average PEV.
Average CGV period The average CEO grant vesting (CGV) period in months,
calculated as the value-weighted average of vesting period
across all performance-based grants in a CEO’s compensa-
tion package, using the data collected from the Incentive
Lab. The vesting period for each grant is computed as
the exponentially-weighted average (with the half-life of 6
months) of vesting months between the start and the end of
the award vesting period.
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Table 1.1 (con’t.): Variable Definitions
Long-term ownership The fraction of shares held by long-term institutional in-
vestors whose portfolio turnover is less than or equal to 35%,
where the portfolio turnover is calculated as the fraction of
shares that are no longer held after three years of their pur-
chases. For the details of the calculation of this measure,
see Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013).
Institutional ownership The fraction of shares held by institutional investors in the
13F data.
Block ownership The fraction of shares held by institutional investors who
own 5% or more of total shares outstanding of the firm.
Sales growth [Sales(t) - sales(t-1)]/sales(t-1).
Cash flow (Earnings before interest and taxes + depreciation)/total
assets.
Debt Total debt/total assets.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.
Q (Total assets - book value of equity + market value of eq-
uity)/total assets.
Investment Capital expenditure over total assets.
R&D Research and development expenditure over total assets.
PV B/M Residual book-to-market (Pástor and Veronesi (2003)).
RRV B/M Residual book-to-market based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2005).
Future excess return Future realized return in excess of its expected return based
on Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza
(2009).
Raw B/M The reciprocal of Q.
Market cap. CRSP price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding
as of the last trading day of May.
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Table 1.1 (con’t.): Variable Definitions
Rank* The rank of each firm based on observed market capitaliza-
tion as of the last trading day of May.
Float adjustment The difference between Rank* and the actual rank assigned
by Russell at the end of June.
G-index The GIM governance index.
ROA Net income divided by total assets.
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Table 1.2 Product Life-cycle Lengths by Industry
SIC code SIC industry name PLC length
343 Heating Equipment, Except Electric 12.98
341 Metal Cans And Shipping Containers 12.75
345 Screw Machine Products, Bolts, Nuts, Screws 12.53
342 Cutlery, Handtools, And General Hardware 12.36
344 Fabricated Structural Metal Products 12.18
349 Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Products 12.03
353 Construction, Mining, And Materials Handling 11.90
372 Aircraft and Parts 11.76
358 Refrigeration And Service Industry Machinery 11.62
366 Communications Equipment 11.47
351 Engines And Turbines 11.31
283 Drugs 11.19
369 Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment 11.04
335 Rolling, Drawing, Extruding Of Metals 10.91
285 Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels 10.75
354 Metalworking Machinery and Equipment 10.62
363 Household Appliances 10.58
352 Farm And Garden Machinery And Equipment 10.43
384 Surgical, Medical, Dental Instruments And Supplies 10.26
289 Miscellaneous Chemical Products 10.15
131 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 10.07
359 Miscellaneous Industrial And Commercial 9.94
371 Motor Vehicles And Motor Vehicle Equipment 9.81
346 Metal Forgings And Stampings 9.70
138 Oil and Gas Field Services 9.62
386 Photographic Equipment And Supplies 9.53
379 Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment 9.46
355 Special Industry Machinery, Except Metalworking 9.37
481 Telephone Communications 9.27
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Table 1.2 (con’t.): Product Life-cycle Lengths by Industry
220 Textile mill products 9.15
331 Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, Mills 9.01
737 Programming, Data, and Computer Related Services 8.88
356 General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 8.74
381 Detection and Navigation Instruments, Equipment 8.61
483 Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 8.46
738 Miscellaneous Business Services 8.30
364 Electric Lighting and Wiring Equipment 8.15
291 Petroleum Refining 8.01
284 Soap, Detergents, Cosmetics 7.83
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 7.62
367 Electronic Components And Accessories 7.39
287 Agricultural Chemicals 7.14
357 Computer and Office Equipment 6.90
365 Household Audio and Video Equipment 6.62
387 Watches, Clocks, Clockwork Operated Devices 6.29
383 Electronics Machinery 5.99
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the variables for the sample that I use to examine how long-term
institutional ownership is associated with corporate investment horizon. All variables are defined in Table
1.1.
Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Panel A. Firm-Level Variables
Average PLC length 9.6409 1.4360 8.3579 9.6530 10.7377 6619
Average PEV 12.8608 4.1883 9.6518 11.6151 13.9902 6619
Ln(Average PEV) 2.5102 0.2838 2.2671 2.4523 2.6384 6619
Average CGV period 12.9456 8.3327 7.8750 11.5000 15.0313 1232
Long-term ownership 0.3228 0.2263 0.0968 0.3494 0.5080 6591
Long-term block ownership 0.1009 0.1107 0.0000 0.0912 0.1788 6591
Institutional ownership 0.4724 0.3213 0.1513 0.5115 0.7475 6591
Sales growth 0.1257 0.4047 -0.0288 0.0758 0.1885 6536
Cash flow 0.0981 0.1708 0.0731 0.1197 0.1672 6557
Debt 0.2199 0.1874 0.0722 0.2026 0.3159 6559
Size 6.4138 2.1904 4.8436 6.3758 7.9578 6569
Q 1.8476 1.4181 1.1250 1.4464 2.0610 6527
Investment 0.0509 0.0472 0.0224 0.0386 0.0647 6472
R&D 0.0539 0.0886 0.0083 0.0265 0.0696 6554
Panel B. Segment-Level Variables
PLC length 9.5557 1.2362 8.7100 9.7300 10.6100 21170
PEV 16.7895 13.9524 9.7163 11.8385 16.0505 21170
Investment 0.0587 0.0578 0.0225 0.0433 0.0749 21035
Ln(Sales) 5.1674 2.1822 3.7091 5.2376 6.7154 20958
Cash flow 0.1212 0.2349 0.0469 0.1236 0.2119 18991
Size 4.9000 2.2330 3.3405 4.9399 6.5103 21027
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Table 1.4 Horizon Alignment between Investors and Firms: Panel Regressions
This table reports the results of panel regressions on the relationship between long-tern institutional own-
ership and corporate investment horizon, corporate investment value, and managerial incentive horizon,
proxied by the average product life-cycle (PLC) lengths, the average patent economic value (PEV), and the
average CEO’s grant vesting (CGV) period, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1.1. I include
year fixed effects and/or firm fixed effects in the specifications. In each column, I report estimated coeffi-
cients from OLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table
documents positive correlations between long-term institutional ownerships and the average PLC length,
PEV, and CGV period in the following year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Avg. PLC length Ln(Avg. PEV) Avg. CGV period
LT ownership 3.1923** 3.1577** 0.2123** 0.2055** 37.1639*** 19.5515**
(2.61) (1.98) (2.78) (2.46) (3.84) (2.17)
Inst. ownership -0.8280 -0.8275 -0.2095*** -0.1637** -15.4475*** -9.2222**
(-1.01) (-1.51) (-3.88) (-2.25) (-3.86) (-2.04)
Sales growth 0.1795*** -0.0117 -0.0525** 0.0028 0.9387 0.8867
(3.85) (-0.39) (-2.40) (0.25) (0.53) (0.67)
Cash flow 0.0014 0.0052 0.0852*** -0.0733 13.5285*** 0.9754
(0.04) (0.25) (3.47) (-1.62) (4.54) (0.18)
Debt 0.3612*** 0.0796 0.0547 -0.0669* 1.3466 -3.8583
(7.23) (1.42) (1.50) (-1.69) (0.67) (-1.62)
Size -0.0814*** -0.0416 0.0210*** 0.0105 0.3767 -0.0435
(-15.28) (-1.27) (8.27) (0.69) (1.66) (-0.04)
Q -0.0470*** 0.0130 0.0113** 0.0001 -0.2881 -0.3840
(-3.88) (1.02) (2.55) (0.02) (-0.91) (-1.29)
Investment -1.4071** -0.1976 -0.0709 -0.0923 -13.4945 9.8252
(-2.56) (-1.31) (-0.64) (-0.90) (-1.31) (0.80)
R&D -2.2622*** 0.1332 0.4869*** -0.0219 -19.4588*** -6.6132
(-7.79) (0.76) (4.94) (-0.28) (-4.70) (-1.15)
Constant 9.6705*** 9.5818*** 1.7925*** 1.8119*** 7.8656*** 9.3395
(705.95) (182.25) (64.65) (20.07) (3.60) (1.16)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 6,052 6,052 6,052 6,052 1,190 1,190
R2 0.0826 0.1471 0.0595 0.0966 0.0695 0.1040
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Table 1.5 Pre-treatment sample differences around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold
This table reports the mean differences in various firm characteristics around the Russell 1000/2000 thresh-
old in the year prior to the index assignment. The discontinuity tests are done by regressing each firm
characteristic on the dummy variable Russell 2000 (Russ2000 ) which is equal to one if the firm belongs to
the Russell 2000 index, for each subsample with different bandwidths in the neighborhood of the threshold.
The bandwidths 20, 25, 30, and 35 indicate the subsamples of firms ranked in [981, 1020], [976, 1025],
[971, 1030], and [966, 1035], respectively, based on observed market capitalization from CRSP as of the last
trading day of May. All dependent variables are defined in Table 1.1. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statisti-
cal significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that there is no significant
differences in observed market capitalization, long-term institutional ownership, sales growth, cash flow,
debt ratio, and average product life-cycle length in very small bandwidths around the Russell 1000/2000
threshold in the year prior to the index assignment, which means that firms are very similar on both sides
of the threshold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Long-term Sales Cash
Debt
Average
Dependent variable cap. ownership growth flow PLC length
Russ2000 (bandwith=20) 10.76 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.04
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (-0.02) (0.21) (0.31)
Russ2000 (bandwith=25) 13.92 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.10) (0.08) (-0.02) (-0.41) (0.39) (0.34)
Russ2000 (bandwith=30) -16.27 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02
(-0.19) (0.25) (-0.03) (-0.60) (0.19) (0.19)
Russ2000 (bandwith=35) -71.22 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05
(-0.94) (0.73) (0.33) (-0.98) (0.66) (0.41)
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Table 1.6 Differences in Long-term Ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold:
First-Stage Regressions
This table reports the regression discontinuity test results from first-stage regressions on the differences in
long-term (block) institutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Russell 2000 is defined
in Table 1.5. Rank* is the rank of each firm based on observed market capitalization as of the last trading
day of May. Float adjustment is defined as the difference between Rank* and the actual rank assigned by
Russell at the end of June. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. I include year fixed effects in all
specifications. In each column, I report estimated coefficients from OLS regression and their t-statistics,
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that there is a sharp discontinuity in long-term
(block) institutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, i.e., long-term (block) institutional
ownerships of firms that are at the top of the Russell 2000 are much larger than those of slightly larger
firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Long-term ownership Long-term block ownership
Russell2000 0.0635*** 0.0612*** 0.0310** 0.0331**
(4.73) (4.18) (2.34) (2.68)
(Rank* - 1000) -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0002
(-1.38) (-1.16) (0.73) (0.47)
(Rank* - 1000) x Russell 2000 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.64) (0.43) (-1.43) (-1.17)
Float adjustment 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001** 0.0001**
(12.40) (10.50) (2.77) (2.79)
Constant 0.3103*** 0.3065*** 0.1161*** 0.1269***
(17.20) (12.78) (4.37) (4.92)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 366 366 366 366
R2 0.1412 0.2157 0.0480 0.0582
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Table 1.7 Horizon Alignment between Investors and Firms: Instrumental Variable
Estimates
This table presents the results of 2SLS regressions on the effects long-term institutional ownership on cor-
porate investment horizon, the value of corporate investment, and managerial incentive horizon, proxied
by the average product life-cycle (PLC) length, the average patent economic value (PEV), and the aver-
age CEO’s grant vesting (CGV) period, respectively. 2SLS regressions instrument long-term ownership
using the dummy variable Russell 2000 defined in Table 1.5. Rank* and Float adjustment are defined in
Table 1.6. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. I include year fixed effects in all regressions. In
each column, I report estimated coefficients from 2SLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that through sharply increased long-term institutional
ownerships, the average product life-cycle length, the average PLC length, PEV, and CGV period of the
firms at the top of the Russell 2000 are significantly greater than those of the slightly larger firms at the
bottom of the Russell 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Avg. PLC length Ln(Avg. PEV) Avg. CGV period
Long-term ownership 3.2317** 3.2568** 0.2450** 0.2366** 21.2536** 20.6219**
(2.52) (2.47) (2.58) (2.40) (2.54) (2.50)
(Rank* - 1000) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0010 0.0010 0.1501 0.1522
(0.34) (0.35) (1.43) (1.27) (0.54) (0.59)
(Rank* - 1000) x Russell 2000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.2399 -0.2408
(-0.11) (-0.12) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-0.53) (-0.54)
Float adjustment -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0236 0.0244
(-0.64) (-0.57) (0.88) (0.79) (0.57) (0.61)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 366 366 324 324 77 77
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Table 1.8 Horizon Alignment between Investors and Firms: Cross-sectional Effects
This table reports the results of IV-2SLS regressions on the effects of long-tern ownerships on corporate
investment horizons, the value of corporate investment, and managerial incentive horizon, separately for
the subsamples of more (above-median) and less (below-median) undervalued firms. Undervaluation is
proxied by four different measures: residual book-to-market based on Pástor and Veronesi (2003) (PV
residual B/M ); residual book-to-market based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) (RRV
residual B/M ); future excess returns based on Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza
(2009) (Future excess return); and raw book-to-market based on Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)
(Raw B/M). Long-term ownership is instrumented by the dummy variable Russell 2000 defined in Table
1.5. I control for distance from threshold, float adjustment, and year fixed effects in all specifications. In
each column, I report estimated coefficients from 2SLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that the horizon alignment effects are stronger for more
undervalued firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Undervaluation Proxy
PV B/M RRV B/M Fut. exc. ret. Raw B/M
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Dep. Var. Average PLC length
LTO 2.9128* 3.5014** 2.6687* 3.7870*** 2.0776 3.5707*** 0.6655 3.2216**
(1.91) (2.63) (1.86) (2.98) (0.83) (3.09) (0.26) (2.14)
N 190 175 182 163 157 185 171 192
Dep. Var. Ln(Average PEValue)
LTO -0.1226 0.2408** 0.8950 0.2503** -0.2502 0.2297** -0.1195 0.2367**
(-0.44) (2.60) (0.94) (2.35) (-0.28) (2.29) (-0.26) (2.44)
N 160 154 158 151 143 169 145 164
Dep. Var. Average CGV period
LTO -7.2935 22.7628*** 4.0811 20.6900** -2.4752 21.9286** 1.5061 22.0803***
(-0.39) (3.42) (0.48) (2.40) (-0.24) (3.44) (0.16) (3.24)
N 39 38 37 32 35 42 37 40
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.9 Long-Term Institutional Ownership and Investments across Segments
This table reports the results of IV-2SLS regressions on the cross-sectional differences across segments in
the effect of long-term institutional ownership (LTO) on segment investments depending on the segments’
product life-cycle lengths. Long PLC is a dummy variable equal to one for the segments with above-median
product life-cycle lengths within the firm in a given year. High Value is a dummy variable equal to one
for the segments with above-median patent economic values within the firm in a given year. Long-term
ownership is instrumented by the dummy variable Russell 2000 defined in Table 1.5. I control for distance
from threshold, float adjustment, firm-industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects in all specifications. In
each column, I report estimated coefficients from 2SLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by industry. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that an inflow of long-term
institutional investors leads to capital reallocations by firms from short-horizon and less-profitable to long-
horizon and more-profitable segments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Investment
LTO -0.0075** -0.0072** -0.0079** -0.0069**
(-2.02) (-1.99) (-2.12) (-2.06)
Long PLC 0.0004 0.0027* -0.0042* -0.0053*
(0.23) (1.73) (-1.77) (-1.95)
High PEV 0.0053* 0.0062*
(1.80) (1.85)
LTO × Long PLC 0.0092** 0.0086** -0.0002 -0.0030
(2.08) (2.04) (-0.03) (-0.69)
LTO × High PEV -0.0032 -0.0045
(-0.43) (-0.61)
Long PLC × High PEV -0.0019 0.0004
(-0.32) (0.09)
LTO × Long PLC × High PEV 0.0286*** 0.0238**
(2.66) (2.19)
Constant 0.0708*** 0.0683*** 0.0701*** 0.0680***
(55.25) (54.07) (45.84) (45.14)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Industry x Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 988 988 811 811
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Table 1.10 Horizon Alignment between Block-holders and Firms: Instrumental Variable
Estimates
This table presents the results of 2SLS regressions on the effects long-term block institutional ownership
on corporate investment horizon, the value of corporate investment, and managerial incentive horizon,
proxied by the average product life-cycle (PLC) length, the average patent economic value (PEV), and the
average CEO’s grant vesting (CGV) period, respectively. 2SLS regressions instrument long-term ownership
using the dummy variable Russell 2000 defined in Table 1.5. Rank* and Float adjustment are defined in
Table 1.6. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. I include year fixed effects in all regressions. In
each column, I report estimated coefficients from 2SLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that through sharply increased long-term block institutional
ownerships, the average product life-cycle length, the average PLC length, PEV, and CGV period of the
firms at the top of the Russell 2000 are significantly greater than those of the slightly larger firms at the
bottom of the Russell 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Avg. PLC length Ln(Avg. PEV) Avg. CGV period
Long-term block ownership 2.3016** 2.1672*** 0.1503** 0.1891** 13.9178** 14.6171**
(2.33) (3.10) (2.11) (2.46) (2.31) (2.39)
(Rank* - 1000) -0.0044 -0.0018 0.0048 0.0044 0.0815 0.0142
(-0.77) (-0.82) (0.83) (0.85) (0.58) (0.13)
(Rank* - 1000) x Russell 2000 0.0068 0.0029 -0.0068 -0.0063 -0.1513 -0.0384
(0.89) (1.05) (-0.96) (-0.99) (-0.68) (-0.24)
Float adjustment -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0026 -0.0226
(-0.49) (-0.75) (0.34) (0.31) (-0.10) (-0.61)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 366 366 324 324 77 77
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND OPERATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS GROUPS
2.1 Introduction
We investigate risk-management of Korean business groups, called chaebol, in the aftermath
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was an unexpected
event that unarguably reduced the supply of liquidity in Korean markets and thus sharply
increased the cost of external financing. When the cost of external financing increases, firms
are expected to reduce risk or, cash-flow volatility. This is because high cash-flow volatility
increases the probability of cash-flow shortfalls, which in turn increases demand for external
financing (Minton and Schrand (1999)). Chaebol have strategic advantages over stand-
alone firms in achieving risk reduction. First, a chaebol consists of multiple member firms
that operate in various industries that involve varying levels of risk. Second, internal capital
markets enable chaebol to transfer cash across member firms, in particular transferring cash
from risky member firms to safe member firms to increase (reduce) investment in the latter
(former), whereas risky stand-alone firms may have to cut back on investment to reduce
risk. On the other hand, the expectation that the Korean government would rescue chaebol
in case of financial distress may disincentivize chaebol to reduce risk in the aftermath of
the crisis. The goal of this study is to investigate whether internal capital markets and
risk-variability across member firms allowed chaebol to reduce risk in the aftermath of the
1997 financial crisis. It is a suitable time to study operational risk management of firms
because hoarding cash as a financial risk management strategy was extremely costly during
the financial crisis period. In addition, firms were unable to manage risk using derivative
because financial derivatives markets were not well developed in emerging markets in 1990s.
Our results indicate that risky chaebol member firms reduced investment to a greater
extent than safe member firms during the post-crisis period (1997-1998) compared with the
pre-crisis period (1995-1996). As a main proxy for level of risk, we use firm-level volatil-
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ity of cash flows (CF vol ), which is defined as the standard deviation of earnings before
interest and taxes plus depreciation divided by total assets over the 1990 through 1997
period.1 Controlling for chaebol -year fixed effects, investment opportunities and other firm
characteristics, a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller
decline in capital expenditures of approximately 3.2% of firm assets. This effect is econom-
ically significant, as it equals approximately 24% of the standard deviation and 34% of the
sample average value of investment.
We provide evidence that internal capital markets provide the channel through which
chaebol reduced risk. Like Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015), we analyze equity investments
across member firms and find that low-risk member firms sold equity to high-risk member
firms in the post-crisis period.2 This result suggests that a one-standard-deviation decrease
in CF vol is associated with an increase in net equity transfer of approximately 7.5% of firm
assets. Thus, chaebol firms with low CF vol received economically substantial transfers
of capital following the crisis. However, chaebol firms do not exhibit a similar pattern of
equity investments in the pre-crisis period.
We conduct cross-sectional analyses across chaebol to strengthen the interpretation of
risk reduction in response to increased costs of external financing. We first investigate
whether within-group risk-variability helped chaebol reduce risk. If all member firms have
the same level of risk, capital reallocation would not contribute to risk reduction. However,
if member firms were to vary significantly along the level of risk, a given group would be
better able to reduce risk effectively through capital reallocation to safe member firms.
For the analysis, we define risk variability as the standard deviation of CF vol across
member firms in each chaebol group. We then examine the possible association between
risk variability and risk reduction.
Our empirical result indicates that the negative association between CF vol and post-
crisis investment is stronger for high-risk-variability chaebol compared with low-risk-variability
chaebol. In particular, a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with an
increase in capital expenditure of approximately 1.9% of firm assets among below-median
risk-variability groups, whereas the same decrease in CF vol is associated with an increase
in capital expenditures of approximately 4.6% of firm assets among above-median risk-
1In section VII.D, we use alternative measures of risk and the results of all analyses remain qualitatively
the same.
2Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) find evidence that chaebol transfer cash to group firms with more
lucrative investment opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q) after the crisis. Thus, we control for Tobin’s
Q in all analyses.
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variability groups. This result is consistent with the proposition that high risk variability
helps chaebol reduce risk effectively.
We next examine the association between risk reduction and group-level external financ-
ing dependence.3 Because firms that depend heavily on external financing would be more
severely affected by a sudden increase in the cost of external financing following the crisis,
chaebol with high external financing dependence are expected to engage more actively in
risk reduction. We find support for this prediction. Our empirical results indicate that
a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with an increase in post-crisis
capital expenditures of approximately 1.8% of firm assets among below-median external
financing-dependence groups, whereas the same decrease in CF vol is associated with an
increase in post-crisis capital expenditures of approximately 4.7% of firm assets among
above-median external-financing-dependence groups.
To further ensure that risk variability and internal capital markets allowed chaebol to
reduce risk in the aftermath of the crisis, we compare investment of chaebol firms with in-
vestment of otherwise similar stand-alone firms. Like chaebol, stand-alone firms, especially
risky ones, are expected to reduce investment during the crisis. Because stand-alone firms
are unable to reallocate capital toward safer firms, however, their aggregate investment
would decrease to a greater extent than that of chaebol. On the other hand, if the reduc-
tion in investment by stand-alone firms were to be similar to that of chaebol, stand-alone
firms would be collectively less successful in achieving risk reduction.
Our results support this expectation. Expanding the sample to all public stand-alone
firms in Korea, we find that stand-alone firms reduced investment, but risky firms reduced
investment to a greater extent than safe firms after the crisis. However, when we repeat
the baseline analysis using pseudo-chaebol groups whose member firms are selected from
stand-alone firms via a matching procedure,4 we do not find a negative association between
risk and post-crisis investment within each pseudo-chaebol group. This result indicates that
stand-alone firms with characteristics similar to those of our sample chaebol firms did not
exhibit similar investment patterns.
We further find support for the aforementioned expectations from the comparison anal-
3While some fundamental variables such as cash holdings and cash flow are widely used measures of
corporate liquidity in the literature, we use a more exogenous measure of external financing dependence,
proxied by Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) industry-level technology-based external financing dependence mea-
sure, following Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015).
4We base our matching procedure on the pre-crisis level of investment, investment growth rate, CF vol,
Tobin’s Q, size, cash flow, cash, leverage, and industry.
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yses of aggregate investment and overall risk between chaebol and pseudo-chaebol around
the Asian crisis. The result of the aggregate investment analysis indicates that both chaebol
and pseudo-chaebol reduced investment in 1998 compared with 1997 but chaebol reduced
investment to a lesser extent than pseudo-chaebol. In particular, the reduction in aggregate
capital expenditures by chaebol was approximately 2% of assets, whereas that of pseudo-
chaebol was 6% of assets. The matching estimator suggests that chaebol firms were able
to reduce capital expenditures less by 4.45% of their assets compared with pseudo-chaebol
firms. More importantly, the overall risk of chaebol decreased to a significantly greater
extent than that of pseudo-chaebol. We find that the asset-weighted average of CF vol
of chaebol is significantly lower than that of pseudo-chaebol during the post-crisis period,
whereas these averages are similar during the pre-crisis period. These results are consistent
with the proposition that stand-alone firms need to cut investment to reduce risk, whereas
internal capital markets allow chaebol to better reduce risk while reducing investment to
a lesser extent.
We consider alternative explanations of our findings. First, we examine the possibility
that the negative association between CF vol and post-crisis investment is attributable to
investment opportunities. For example, the association between CF vol and investment
opportunities could have become negative after the crisis. Another possibility is that CF
vol and investment opportunities are generally negatively associated but chaebol became
more sensitive to investment opportunities after the crisis. That would increase investment
in member firms with better investment opportunities relative to other within-group firms
(Almeida, Kim, and Kim(2015)). However, our empirical results indicate that CF vol
is associated with neither investment opportunities in general nor post-crisis investment
opportunities. We also consider the possibility that low-risk firms systematically generate
high cash flows and that chaebol allocated more resources to member firms that produce
higher cash flows in response to the increased cost of external financing. We do not,
however, find any supporting evidence for this possibility. One might be concerned that
our findings are attributable to debt capacity. For example, low-risk firms likely have
higher debt capacity and thus would be able to invest more robustly during the post-crisis
period. To address this possibility, we examine the relationship between debt growth and
CF vol but find no evidence of differential debt growth in low- and high-risk firms within
each chaebol.
We repeat our baseline specification tests for placebo (nonexistent) crises in 1995 and
2005 but find no significant association between risk and investment either before or after
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the placebo crises. It appears that the negative association between risk and investment
hold only when the cost of external financing increases suddenly.
We investigate the possibility that the negative association between CF vol and post-
crisis investment is attributable to negative demand shock in product markets following
the crisis rather than to the increased cost of external financing. One possible scenario, for
example, is that high-risk firms were more adversely affected by demand shock than low-
risk firms during the post-crisis period, thereby reducing investment still further. However,
we do not find a negative relationship between CF vol and investment during a recessionary
period that was not accompanied by a reduction in the supply of external liquidity. This
result suggests that our baseline results are less likely to be attributable to demand shock
in product markets.
We also examine whether the degree of diversification increased after the crisis, which
could be another way of reducing risk for chaebol. For this analysis we employ a diversifica-
tion measure developed by Duchin (2010) but find no evidence of increased diversification
among chaebol during the post-crisis period.
Our results continue to hold for alternative measures of risk. For example, the results
remain qualitatively the same when we use CF vol computed over five years prior to the
crisis (over the 1993 through 1997 period). We also consider the possibility that the risk
of group firms changed differentially after the crisis. Because we use predetermined levels
of risk, we cannot draw the same conclusion if each group firm’s risk after the crisis differs
from its pre-crisis level. However, we find that a member firm’s within-group rank in CF
vol does not change after the crisis.
This paper contributes to studies on corporate diversification. A number of papers
provide evidence of the existence and (in)efficiency of internal capital markets in diver-
sified firms. Among those, our study is most closely related to Almeida, Kim, and Kim
(2015), who use the same 1997 Asian financial crisis to provide evidence of the efficiency
of chaebol ’s internal capital markets. In particular, they show that chaebol made efficient
investments by allocating resources to member firms with better investment opportunities,
and thus could reduce investment to a lesser extent than stand-alone firms. Although we
use the same event, we differ from Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) in that we focus on risk
management in chaebol.
This paper is also related to Duchin (2010), who studies cash holdings of diversified firms.
He theoretically and empirically shows that diversified firms hoard less cash due to lower
levels of risk, which arise from less-than-perfect cross-divisional correlations in investment
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opportunities or cash flows. Although both our paper and Duchin (2010) consider the risk
and liquidity of diversified firms, we differ from Duchin (2010) in at least two important
ways. First, we focus on risk management responses to changes in the cost of external
liquidity, whereas Duchin (2010) focuses on liquidity management at a given level of risk.
Second, with respect to risk, Duchin (2010) focuses on coinsurance benefits, whereas we
focus on benefits that arise from variability in risk across operational subunits.
This paper is related to studies investigating the consequences of financial crises. Most of
these studies use the 2007 U.S. financial crisis as an adverse shock to the supply of external
finance and investigate its effect on levels of investment. For example, Almeida, Campello,
Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011) use that episode and find that firms whose long-term
debt was maturing immediately after the crisis reduced investment to a greater extent
than otherwise similar firms whose debt was mostly scheduled to mature in later years.
Similarly, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that investment decreased significantly
in the aftermath of the crisis, especially in financially constrained firms with low cash
holdings and high short-term debt that operate in industries with high external financing
dependency. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) show through survey results that, in
the aftermath of the financial crisis, constrained firms had to bypass attractive investment
opportunities, use up more cash and draw more credit lines, and reduce capital expenditures
and employment. Song and Lee (2012), on the other hand, use the 1997 Asian financial
crisis to study the long-run impact of the crisis on corporate cash holdings in East Asian
countries and find that Asian firms started building up their cash holdings after the crisis,
motivated to make precautionary savings. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the
first to provide empirical evidence of reduced risk-taking following a financial crisis. In this
regard, our paper is related to studies that document increased risk aversion on the part of
individual investors following the 2007 U.S. financial crisis (Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings
(2013), Chiang and Xiao (2017)).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
In Section 2.3, we describe the data and summary statistics. We report baseline results in
Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we report the results of cross-sectional analyses. Section 2.6
present the results of analyses comparing chaebol with stand-alone firms. In Section 2.7,
we address alternative explanations. We conclude in Section 2.8.
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2.2 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Korean Chaebol
The 1997 Asian financial crisis was the most catastrophic event ever to afflict the wider
Korean economy. The crisis was truly unprecedented and unexpected in terms of both the
timing and the magnitude of the shock to the Korean economy.5 It started in early 1997 in
Southeast Asia and many Korean firms went bankrupt over the course of the year. However,
the Korean government, along with too many firms, banks, financial institutions, investors,
and even some international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
did not take it seriously.6 As a result, Korea ran out of foreign exchange reserves and found
itself in a sovereign default situation. To avoid default, the Korean government agreed in
December 1997 to the terms of a bailout by the IMF. This series of events had a serious
impact on the Korean economy. In particular, it severely affected the supply of liquidity
inside the economy. At the onset of the Asian crisis, most funding sources in Korea dried
up and consequently the cost of external financing dramatically increased. In practice, it
was almost impossible for Korean firms to attract funding from outside in the aftermath
of the crisis.
Even though studying investment by conglomerates around the 2007 U.S. financial crisis
could provide an alternative laboratory in which to study similar phenomena, we exploit
the Asian financial crisis and study chaebol. First, chaebol are far more diversified than
U.S. conglomerates. Chaebol consist of multiple group member firms operating in multi-
ple, often unrelated, industries. This feature increases variability in firm characteristics,
including the cash-flow risk within each chaebol group. Moreover, we can directly observe
the workings of internal capital markets in chaebol by analyzing equity transfers across
member firms. In combination these two features enable us to examine how internal capi-
tal markets with diversified divisions facilitate corporate risk management when the costs
of external financing increase sharply.
Studying Korean chaebol provides an additional comparative advantage over using U.S.
segment- or plant-level data with respect to measuring two important firm-level variables
in our study, that is, Tobin’s Q and cash-flow risk: each member firm in a chaebol issues its
own financial statement and equity, providing us with accurate and detailed information
5For details on the magnitude of the shock to the Korean economy and financial markets, see Almeida,
Kim, and Kim (2015).
6Based on reports by various institutions or articles in the media, they were rather positive and hopeful
about the prospects for the Korean economy. The OECD membership that Korea acquired 1996 also
blinded them to the real threat to the economy.
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on each firm’s characteristics, including market value. This is an important feature of our
data because researchers need not only to look at the level of investment and cash-flow risk
in each operational subunit inside the member corporations to study how firms (or business
groups) manage and respond to risk in their operations, but also to control for subunit-
level investment opportunities to make this investment model comprehensive.7 On the
other hand, U.S. segment- and plant-level data are limited for this purpose insofar as the
former do not provide a unique identifier for each segment, which prevents researchers from
tracing time-series variation on any segment characteristics, and the latter do not provide
information on the cost of goods sold or sales, or general or administrative expenses, taxes,
etc. Because of these limitations, researchers can neither measure division-level investment
opportunities nor calculate each division’s cash-flow volatilities using U.S. data.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
2.3.1 Data and variables
The data for this paper are compiled from several sources. Firm-level accounting informa-
tion is obtained from the TS2000 provided by the Korea Listed Companies Association,
which is deemed to be one of the most complete and representative corporate databases.
The list of chaebol member firms is acquired from the White Paper on Fair Trade, which
is published annually by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. Finally, we hand-collect data
on intra-chaebol equity transfers from disclosure filing documents in the Korea Investor’s
Network for Disclosure (KIND) System developed by the Korea Exchange.
Insofar as we concentrate on chaebol groups, our sample for the baseline analyses includes
all publicly listed firms in the top 30 largest chaebol as of 1997 ranked by the Korean Fair
Trade Commission (KFTC). For these chaebol member firms in the sample, we draw ac-
counting and financial information for the 1990 through 1999 period using company names
and company histories to minimize the loss of relevant observations, because the KFTC
7Risk-taking behaviors among financial institutions such as banks (e.g., Acharya and Naqvi (2012)),
insurance companies (e.g., Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Wang (2015)), and even industrial firms (e.g.,
Duchin, Gilbert, Harford, and Hrdlicka (2017)) are studied using the composition of financial asset holdings
in each firm. While this approach is useful for studying corporate risk management through financial assets
in developed markets, it may not work for emerging markets where financial assets, especially derivatives,
are not well developed.
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provides no identification code for chaebol firms.8 We then eliminate firms with missing
data for 1997 - immediately before the Asian financial crisis, or for 1998 -immediately after
the crisis. Our baseline tests focus on the 1996 through 1999 period (centered on the crisis).
For this period, the final sample consists of 414 (chaebol) firm-years.
To understand how chaebol groups reallocate their internal resources across member
firms, we hand-collect additional data on intra-chaebol equity investments from the KIND
System by reading each disclosure file as in Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015).9 Each disclo-
sure file describes a transaction in which a chaebol firm transfers cash to another member
firm in exchange for acquiring an equity stake. We merge these data with our accounting
and financial data from TS2000. All the data on equity investments must be manually
and individually matched to the accounting and financial data using company names as
well as company histories. We eliminate observations from firms that are not successfully
matched. These procedures lead to 1,341 public firm-level transactions.
Our main variable of interest is the firm-level volatility of cash flows (CF vol ), which
we use as a proxy for the level of risk at the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Following
other studies (e.g., Zhang (2006), Avramov et al. (2007), Giroud and Mueller (2010),
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013), etc.), we define CF vol as the standard deviation
of earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation divided by total assets over the 1990
through 1997 period, namely,
σ(CF)i1990,1997 = σ((EBITDA
i/Total Assetsi)1990,1997).
The definitions of other variables are as follows. Investment (Investment) is defined as
capital expenditures over total assets. Firm size (Size) is equal to the natural logarithm of
total assets. Tobin’s Q (Q) is total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
value of equity over total assets. Cash flow (Cash flow) is earnings before interest and taxes
plus depreciation divided by total assets. Cash (Cash) is the sum of cash holdings and
short-term investments divided by total assets, and leverage (Debt) equals total debt over
total assets. Net equity transfer (Net equity transfer), our measure of capital reallocation
across member firms within a chaebol group, is defined as the sum of equities sold to
other member firms minus equities purchased from other member firms, divided by total
assets. This firm-level variable is obtained by aggregating all transaction observations for
8We use data prior to 1995 to obtain enough variability in return on assets, which is used to calculate
our measure of corporate risk.
9See section II.F in Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) for details on the data collection procedure.
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each firm-year and scaling by total firm assets. After eliminating private chaebol firms
the market values of whose equities are not observable, the final sample for the capital
reallocation analyses consists of a panel of 250 firm-years with yearly transaction-level
data. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels in all our analyses.
2.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 summarizes the firm-level Korean chaebol data for the sample periods (1996
through 1999) used in our analyses. Our sample consists of 26 chaebol groups with 414
member firm-year observations, namely, 16 (publicly listed) firm-year observations for each
chaebol group on average. For interpretation purposes the table also reports data on within-
chaebol variation in our risk measures. The statistics reported in this paper are largely
consistent with those reported in other work using Korean data from the Asian crisis (e.g.,
Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015)).
2.4 Baseline results
2.4.1 Investment
Table 2.3 presents the results of regression analyses of the relationship between risk and
investment on chaebol around the crisis. The dependent variable is Investment. After is
an indicator variable that is equal to one for the post-crisis period, i.e. 1998-1999, and zero
for the pre-crisis period, i.e. 1996-1997. The main variable of interest is the interaction
between CF vol and After. We control for Size, Q, Cash flow, Cash, and Debt. To control
for changes in the association between investment and our control variables around the
crisis, we also include interactions between After and all control variables. We additionally
control for chaebol fixed effects, as seen in columns (1) and (2), chaebol fixed effects and
year fixed effects, as seen in columns (3) and (4), and chaebol -year fixed effects, as seen in
columns (5) and (6). Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
In all specifications, the coefficients on interaction between CF vol and After are neg-
ative and statistically significant. Combined with the existing evidence of the decline in
investments among Korean firms during the Asian crisis (e.g., Almeida, Kim, and Kim
(2015)), this result indicates that low-risk member firms reduced investments to a lesser
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extent than high-risk member firms in the same chaebol in the aftermath of the Asian cri-
sis. Given that the standard deviation of the within-chaebol variation in CF vol is 0.0234,
the coefficient on the interaction between CF vol and After in column (6) indicates that
a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller decline in post-
crisis capital expenditures of approximately 3.2% of firm assets. This effect is economically
significant as it is approximately 24% of the standard deviation and 34% of the sample
average value of investment.
On the other hand, the coefficient on CF vol is positive and statistically significant but
smaller in magnitude than the coefficient on the interaction between CF vol and After. This
implies that high-risk member firms invested more than low-risk member firms during the
pre-crisis period. This evidence suggests that there was a clear change in chaebol firms’
investment patterns with regard to the level of cash-flow risk around the crisis.
2.4.2 Capital reallocation
As a potential channel that enabled post-crisis changes in investment, as mentioned above,
we investigate capital reallocation within each chaebol group. In particular, we analyze
intra-chaebol equity investments for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
The results are reported in Table 2.4. The dependent variable is Net equity transfer
in all columns. Following Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) we use Industry Q as a proxy
for firm-level growth opportunities in panel A and firm-level Q in panel B. The sample
period is 1998-1999 (post-crisis) in columns (1) and (2) of both panels and 1996-1997 (pre-
crisis) in columns (3) and (4). We control for only chaebol -year fixed effects in columns
(1) and (3), whereas we control for firm characteristics as well in columns (2) and (4). In
addition to Size, Q, Cash flow, Cash, and Debt, we control for Rajan and Zingles’s (1998)
industry-level external finance dependence measure, which is a relatively exogenous proxy
for a firm’s liquidity.10 Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The coefficients
on the variable of interest, CF vol, seen in columns (1) and (2) of panel A, are negative
and statistically significant, indicating that high-risk member firms bought equities from
low-risk member firms. In other words, chaebol used equity investments to transfer cash to
low-risk member firms during the post-crisis period. Insofar as the standard deviation of
the within-chaebol variation in CF vol is 0.0234, the coefficient estimate shown in column
10Higher external financing dependence means less liquidity.
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(2) suggests that a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with an increase
in net equity transfer of approximately 7.5% of firm assets. Thus, chaebol firms with low
CF vol received economically substantial transfers of capital following the Asian crisis. In
addition, the positive and statistically significant coefficients on external financing depen-
dence in columns (1) and (2) show that member firms with lower liquidity received more
within-chaebol capital than those with higher liquidity when the costs of external financing
rose, which is consistent with existing theories and evidence in the literature. Meanwhile,
the coefficients on CF vol are seen to be statistically and economically insignificant in
columns (3) and (4), indicating that chaebol firms do not exhibit similar equity transfer
patterns in the pre-crisis period. In addition, the number of observations indicates that the
frequency of equity transfer is significantly higher during the post-crisis period. We obtain
similar results as seen in panel B, in which we control for firm-level Tobin’s Q instead of
industry-level Tobin’s Q. Overall, the results reported in Table 2.4 suggest that internal
capital markets provide the channel through which chaebol shifted investment-cash-flow
risk patterns in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. This result also suggests that
post-crisis changes in chaebol investment were endogenous and helps to rule out the pos-
sibility that investment by risky member firms decreased to a greater extent than that of
safe member firms for exogenous reasons.
2.5 Cross-sectional test
In this section, we conduct cross-sectional analyses across chaebol groups to strengthen
the interpretation of risk reduction undertaken by chaebol in response to increased costs of
external finance. First, we examine the relationship between the variability in risk across
member firms and risk reduction. Chaebol with high risk variability across member firms
are expected to be better able to reduce risk than chaebol with low risk variability across
member firms. Next, we analyze the association between external financing dependence
and risk reduction. Because firms that depend heavily on external financing would be
affected more severely by a sudden increase in the cost of external liquidity, chaebol that
are more dependent on external financing are expected to exhibit greater risk reduction.
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2.5.1 Risk variability
We define risk variability as the standard deviation of CF vol across member firms within a
chaebol group. We then create an indicator variable, High Risk Var chaebol, which is equal
to one if a firm belongs to a chaebol group with above-median risk variability and zero
otherwise. The results of the analyses are reported in Table 2.5. The dependent variable
is Investment and the variable of interest is the triple interaction, CF vol × After × High
Risk Var chaebol. Columns (1), (3), and (5) do not control for firm characteristics, whereas
columns (2), (4), and (6) control for firm characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) control
for chaebol fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) control for chaebol fixed effects and year
fixed effects, columns (5) and (6) control for chaebol -year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at group level.
Consistent with the results provided in Table 2.3, the coefficients on CF vol × After
are negative and statistically significant in all columns, indicating that chaebol reduced
investment in high-risk firms in the aftermath of the crisis. In addition, the coefficients
on CF vol × After × High Risk Var chaebol are negative and statistically significant in
all columns. This result suggests that the negative association between risk and post-
crisis investment is significantly more pronounced among chaebol with high risk variability.
For instance, the coefficient estimate shown in column (6) indicates that, among chaebol
groups with below-median risk variability, a one-standard-deviation decrease in CF vol is
associated with a smaller decline in post-crisis capital expenditures of approximately 1.9%
of firm assets. On the other hand, the same decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller
decline in post-crisis capital expenditure of approximately 4.6% of firm assets for groups
with above-median risk variability. This result is consistent with the proposition that
within-group risk-variability helped chaebol to reduce risk during the post-crisis period.
2.5.2 External finance dependence
We examine the association between external financing dependence and post-crisis risk
reduction at the group level. For the analysis, we exploit Rajan and Zingales’s (1998)
industry-level technology-based measure of external financing dependence, following Almeida,
Kim, and Kim (2015). In particular, we first compute the average of external financing
dependence of all member firms in each chaebol. We then define an indicator variable, High
EFD Chaebol, which is equal to one if a firm belongs to an above-median external financing
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dependence group and zero otherwise.
Table 2.6 reports the results of the analysis. The dependent variable is Investment and
the variable of interest is the triple interaction, CF vol × After × High EFD Chaebol. As in
Table 2.5, columns (1), (3), and (5) do not control for firm characteristics, whereas columns
(2), (4), and (6) control for firm characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) control for chaebol
fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) control for chaebol fixed effects and year fixed effects,
columns (5) and (6) control for chaebol -year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
a group level.
Consistent with the results shown in Table 2.3, the coefficients on CF vol × After are
negative and statistically significant in all columns, indicating that chaebol reduced in-
vestment in high-risk firms in the aftermath of the crisis. The coefficients on CF vol ×
After × High EFD Chaebol are also negative and statistically significant in all columns.
This result suggests that the negative association between risk and post-crisis investment is
significantly more pronounced among chaebol with high dependence on external financing.
For example, the coefficient estimate shown in column (6) indicates that a one-standard-
deviation decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller post-crisis reduction in capital
expenditure of approximately 1.8% of firm assets among groups with below-median exter-
nal financing dependence, whereas the same decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller
post-crisis reduction in capital expenditures of approximately 4.7% of firm assets among
groups with above-median external financing dependence.
2.6 Chaebol vs stand-alone firms
In this section, we compare investment patterns of chaebol and stand-alone firms around
the crisis. As with chaebol firms, we expect risky stand-alone firms to reduce risk to a
greater extent than safe stand-alone firms during the post-crisis period. Because stand-
alone firms are unable to reallocate capital toward safe ones, however, their aggregate
investment would decrease to a greater extent than investment on the part of chaebol.
On the other hand, if the reduction in investment of stand-alone firms is similar to that
of chaebol, stand-alone firms would be less able to reduce risk collectively. To test this
expectation, we construct pseudo-chaebol groups using stand-alone chaebol firms that are
selected via a matching procedure, which is based on their pre-crisis levels of investment,
investment growth rates, CF vol, Tobin’s Q, size, cash flow, cash, leverage, and industry.
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We then compare the within-group association between investment and cash-flow risk of
chaebol and pseudo-chaebol firms. We also investigate post-crisis changes in the aggregate
investment of chaebol and pseudo-chaebol firms. Lastly, we compare post-crisis changes in
the overall cash-flow risk of the treated chaebol and pseudo-chaebol groups.
2.6.1 Risk and investment
We examine the relationship between cash-flow risk and post-crisis investment among
stand-alone firms. As with chaebol, we expect to find a negative association between
risk and post-crisis investment as risky stand-alone firms would be expected, in an effort to
reduce risk, to reduce investment to a greater extent than safe firms. The empirical results
are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.7. The dependent variable is Investment
and the variable of interest is CF vol × After. Given that the standard deviation of CF
vol for the sample of stand-alone firms is 0.0329, the coefficient on interaction between CF
vol and After shown in column (2), for instance, indicates that a one-standard-deviation
decrease in CF vol is associated with a smaller decline in capital expenditures of approx-
imately 1.8% of firm assets. This result suggest that stand-alone firms, especially risky
ones, reduced investment as the costs of external financing increased.11
We next examine whether the negative relationship between risk and post-crisis invest-
ment holds within each pseudo-chaebol group. In other words, we repeat the analysis
reported in Table 2.3 using pseudo-chaebol firms, controlling for pseudo-chaebol -year fixed
effects. The results are presented in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is In-
vestment the variable of interest is CF vol × After. The statistically and economically
insignificant coefficient on CF vol × After indicates that pseudo-chaebol groups do not
exhibit a negative association between risk and post-crisis investment within each group.
Lastly, we compare the risk-investment relationship between chaebol and pseudo-chaebol
firms. The results are presented in columns (5) and (6). The variable of interest is CF vol
× After × chaebol and we control for (pseudo-)chaebol -year fixed effects. The coefficient
on the variable of interest is negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient
on CF vol × After is insignificant in both columns. This result indicates that the negative
within-group risk-investment relationship during the post-crisis period holds only among
chaebol firms and is consistent with the proposition that internal capital markets and risk
11We repeat the tests reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.7 using only matched pseudo-chaebol
firms and find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on CF vol × After.
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variability helped chaebol reduce risk in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
2.6.2 Aggregate investment
We examine changes in aggregate investments of chaebol and pseudo-chaebol firms around
the Asian financial crisis. Table 2.8 reports the results of the analysis. Panel A shows
the average levels of investment of chaebol and pseudo-chaebol firms in 1997 and 1998.
In 1997, both groups of firms invested approximately 10.5% of assets and the difference
between the two groups is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the difference
becomes statistically and economically significant in 1998. Although both groups reduced
investment in 1998, the reduction was significantly greater for pseudo-chaebol firms. In
particular, the reduction in capital expenditures of chaebol was approximately 2% of assets,
whereas that of pseudo-chaebol firms was 6% of assets. The matching estimator suggests
that chaebol firms reduced capital expenditures by 4.45% of assets less than pseudo-chaebol
firms. This result is consistent with the proposition that stand-alone firms needed to reduce
investment to reduce risk, whereas risk-variability and internal capital markets allowed
chaebol to reduce risk without significantly cutting back on investment.
In panel B, we repeat the analysis for the 1996-1997 period. In both years chaebol
firms invested more than pseudo-chaebol firms but the difference is insignificant. Although
both groups of firms reduced investment slightly in 1997, the difference in magnitude of
the reduction between the two groups is statistically and economically insignificant. This
result suggests that the results we document in panel A are less likely to be attributable
to pre-existing trends in investment.
2.6.3 Group-level risk
We examine group-level cash-flow risk of chaebol and pseudo-chaebol. For each group,
we compute the asset-weighted average of CF vol across member firms, which we define
as CF vol -grp. The results are presented in Table 2.9. Panel A reports CF vol -grp for
chaebol and pseudo-chaebol groups in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, the difference in CF vol -grp
between the two groups is insignificant. However, the difference becomes statistically and
economically significant in 1998. In particular, CF vol -grp of pseudo-chaebol groups did
not change in 1998, while that of chaebol groups decreased by 0.0319, which is 68% of
the mean. The difference-in-differences estimator suggests that the post-crisis reduction
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in the cash-flow risk of chaebol groups is statistically significant compared with that of
pseudo-chaebol groups.
In panel B, we repeat the analysis for the 1996-1997 period. However, we find no differ-
ences in CF vol -grp or trends in CF vol -grp between the two groups. The overall results
presented in Table 2.9 confirm that chaebol reduced risk to a greater extent while reducing
investment to a lesser extent than similar stand-alone firms.
2.7 Alternative explanations
In this section, we address alternative explanations to the results we present in this paper.
2.7.1 Investment opportunities, cash flows, debt capacity
We examine the possibility that post-crisis changes in investment patterns are attributable
to investment opportunities. For example, our baseline results might be explained by
a negative association between CF vol and post-crisis investment opportunities. Another
possibility is that CF vol and investment opportunities are negatively associated in general
and chaebol became more sensitive to investment opportunities after the crisis. Then
investment in member firms with better investment opportunities would increase (Almeida,
Kim, and Kim(2015)). Although we control for Q and interaction between Q and After in
all of our regression tests, we directly examine the association between CF vol and Q. The
results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.10. The dependent variable is Q.
None of the coefficients on CF vol or interaction between CF vol and After is statistically
or economically significant. This result indicates that CF vol and Q are not particularly
associated in either the pre-crisis or post-crisis periods.
Next, we consider the possibility that CF vol and post-crisis cash flows are negatively
associated and that chaebol allocated more resources to member firms that generate higher
cash flows to accelerate the generation of internal cash flows. Another possibility is that
CF vol and cash flows are generally negatively associated and cash flows became more im-
portant during the post-crisis period. Although we control for Cash flow and interaction
between Cash flow and After in all of our regression tests, we directly examine the asso-
ciation between CF vol and cash flows. The results are presented in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 2.10. The dependent variable is Cash flow and none of the coefficients on CF vol
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or interaction between CF vol and After is statistically significant. This result indicates
that CF vol and cash flows are not particularly associated in either the pre-crisis or the
post-crisis period and that demand for cash flow is unlikely to be the driving force behind
the results we document in this paper.
One might be concerned that the differential patterns in investment in low risk-member
firms and high-risk member firms during the post-crisis period might be attributable to
differential supplies of liquidity. For example, low-risk firms may have higher debt capacity,
enabling them to reduce investment to a lesser extent during the post-crisis period. To
address this possibility, we examine the relationship between debt growth and CF vol. If
our results are attributable to debt capacity, low-risk member firms would exhibit high debt
growth after the crisis compared with high-risk member firms. The results are presented
in columns (5) and (6). The dependent variable is Debt growth and the variable of interest
is the interaction between CF vol and After. The coefficient of interest is statistically
insignificant, suggesting that our findings cannot be explained by the external liquidity
channel.
2.7.2 Placebo tests
Although we examine the association between CF vol and Q above, a possible concern is
that cash flow risk at a given point in time might be negatively correlated with unobservable
changes in investment opportunities. If this was the case, low-risk member firms would
tend to increase investment in the following years irrespective of the negative shock to the
supply of external liquidity. To test this possibility, we repeat our base specification tests
for placebo crises occurring in 1995 and 2005. If there always exist a negative association
between risk and future investment, we would find the same negative association during
the placebo periods.
The results are presented in Table 2.11. The dependent variable is Investment and the
variable of interest is CF vol × After, where CF vol is measured in the years prior to the
placebo crisis and After is an indicator variable that equals one for years after the placebo
crisis and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the 1995 placebo crisis
and columns (3) and (4) show the results for the 2005 placebo crisis. None of the coefficients
on the variable of interest is negative or statistically significant. This result suggests that
the negative association between risk and investment occurs only when the cost of external
financing increases suddenly.
63
Another possibility is that the negative relationship between risk and investment is at-
tributable to negative demand shocks in product markets following the crisis. If high-risk
firms were more heavily affected in product markets than low-risk firms, the negative asso-
ciation between CF vol and postcrisis investment could not be explained by chaebol efforts
to reduce risk in response to higher costs of external financing. To rule out this possibility,
we conduct a placebo test in which we exploit the 2003 credit card crisis that created the
largest negative shock to aggregate demand in Korea since the recovery from the 1997
Asian financial crisis.12 If the results that we report in this paper are attributable to the
economy-wide negative demand shock, we should observe a similarly negative relationship
between risk and investment during the recession period as well. The results are presented
in columns (5) and (6). None of the coefficients of interest is significant, suggesting that the
negative association between risk and post-crisis investment is unlikely to be attributable
to negative demand shocks in product markets.
2.7.3 Economic downturn
The 2003 placebo test, however, cannot completely rule out alternative stories that rely
on time-varying unobservable characteristics. For example, the economic downturn might
have had differential impacts on high- and low-risk chaebol firms, particularly during the
post-crisis period. To address this limitation of the 2003 placebo test, we conduct an
additional analysis.
To the degree that our measure of risk, cash-flow volatility, captures a firm’s market
fluc- tuation sensitivity to cash flows, firms with low risk may be those in which cash
flows are insensitive to fluctuations in product market demand. Given that the 1997 Asian
financial crisis was accompanied by an economic downturn, low-risk firms are expected to
suffer less than high-risk firms that are sensitive to cash flows during the post-crisis period.
Our evidence is therefore potentially subject to an alternative explanation that chaebol
concentrated their resources in member firms that are less sensitive to product market
demand, namely, firms with low cash-flow volatility
Although we control for firm-level cash flows in our analyses, we decompose our risk
12To quickly stimulate the economy by encouraging domestic consumption, the Korean government re-
laxed the regulations regarding credit card businesses, which led to an oversupply of credit to households.
Subsequently, the deregulation led to the collapse of the bubble, which generated nearly a million credit
card delinquents. This crisis finally resulted in the deepest recession period ever that was not accompanied
by a financial crisis.
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measure into idiosyncratic and systematic components and repeat our baseline tests with
each of the risk components to clearly rule out this alternative story. We measure systematic






Then the idiosyncratic component can be computed as
Idiosyncratic Risk =
√
Total Risk2 − Systematic Risk2.
The results are presented in Table 2.12. We repeat our baseline regression analyses,
replacing CF vol with idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk in panel A and panel B,
respectively. The results shown in panel A indicate that the baseline results continue to
hold when we use idiosyncratic risk as a measure of risk. As in the previous tables, we
control for chaebol fixed effects (columns (1) and (2)), chaebol fixed effects and year fixed
effects (columns (3) and (4)), and chaebol -year fixed effects (columns (5) and (6)). The
coefficient of interest is statistically significant and negative in all columns. Given that
the standard deviation of the within-chaebol variation in idiosyncratic risk is 0.0166, the
coefficient of -1.848 shown in column (6) indicates that a one-standard-deviation decrease
in idiosyncratic risk is associated with an increase in investment of approximately 3.1%
of firm assets. This effect is economically significant as it is approximately 23% of the
standard deviation and 33% of the sample average value of investment. This economic
significance is almost equivalent to that of our baseline results.
As shown in panel B, however, when we use systematic risk as our measure of risk,
the coefficient of interest loses significance in all specifications. The results presented in
Table 2.12 indicate that our main specification results are not driven by a firm’s market
fluctuation sensitivity of cash flow during the economic downturn.
2.7.4 Degree of diversification
A business group (conglomerate) generally faces lower cash-flow risk due to diversification
that arises from less-than-perfect cross-member-firm (cross-divisional) correlations in cash
flows. In this section, we examine whether chaebol increased diversification as a way of
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reducing risk during the post-crisis period. For the analysis, we exploit Duchin’s (2010)
measure of diversification in cash flow and compute each chaebol group’s cross-member
firm correlation in cash flows, which we define as CorrCF .
13 CorrCF is always less than
or equal to zero and lower CorrCF indicates greater diversification.
We find that the average of pre-crisis-CorrCF (as of 1997) is -0.00387, whereas the
average of post-crisis-CorrCF (as of 1998) is -0.00343.15 The estimated mean-difference is
0.0004 (t-statistic equal to 0.29). These results indicate that the cross-member correlation
in cash flow increased but was statistically and economically insignificant, suggesting that
chaebol reduced risk in the immediate aftermath of the crisis but probably not through
increasing diversification with respect to cash flows.
2.7.5 Alternative measures of risk
We address concerns arising from the way we measure risk. First, a firm’s pre-crisis risk
and post-crisis risk may differ. Because we use predetermined levels of risk, we cannot draw
the same conclusion if each group firm’s post-crisis level of risk differs from its pre-crisis
level. To address this possibility, we examine the association between pre-crisis risk and
post-crisis risk of sample firms. However, the two measures of risk are significantly and
positively associated. In particular, the estimated coefficient of correlation is 0.98 with a
t-statistic of 159.56.
We also confirm that a member firm’s within-group rank in CF vol does not change after
the crisis. Specifically, we draw the rank of each member firm in terms of CF vol within a
group to which it belongs for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively. We then
estimate the correlation coefficient between the two ranks. The estimated coefficient of
correlation is 0.93 with a t-statistic of 25.38. This result suggests that there have been no
significant changes in ranks of our risk measure since the crisis. In addition, we replicate
base specifications while replacing pre-crisis risk with post-crisis risk, but the results remain
largely the same.
Lastly, we use a five-year window (1993 through 1997) instead of our original eight-year
window (1990 through 1997) to compute CF vol. We repeat our baseline tests with the
five-year window CF vol and all results remain largely the same (e.g., the coefficient on the
interaction term - CF vol × After - in the investment regression is -1.3215 with a t-statistic




Exploiting the 1997 Asian financial crisis, this paper provides empirical evidence that
chaebol were able to reduce cash-flow risk to a greater extent than stand-alone firms while
reducing investment to a lesser extent in response to a sudden increase in the cost of exter-
nal finance. This paper adds to the literature on corporate diversification by documenting
an additional benefit of diversified business organizations, which is effective operational
risk management. Our empirical evidence suggests that such risk management is enabled
by internal capital markets along with high-risk variability within diversified chaebol orga-
nizations.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1 Variable Definitions
CF vol The standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes
plus depreciation divided by total assets over the 1990 to
1997 period.
CF vol within a chaebol CF vol minus the average CF vol across all firms in the same
chaebol.
Investment Capital expenditure over total assets.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.
Q (Total assets - book value of equity + market value of eq-
uity)/total assets.
Cash flow (Earnings before interest and taxes + depreciation)/total
assets.
Cash (Cash + short-term investments)/total assets.
Debt Total debt/total assets.
Debt growth [Total debt(t) - total debt(t-1)]/total assets(t-1).
Net equity transfer The sum of equities sold to other chaebol firms minus the
amount of equities purchased from other chaebol firms, in
Korean won. We aggregate all transaction observations for
each firm-year by taking the sum of transaction amounts,
and scale by firm assets.
RiskVar The standard deviation of CF vol across all member firms
in a chaebol group.




An industry-level measure of external finance dependence
suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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Table 2.1 (con’t.): Variable Definitions
High EFD Chaebol A dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a
chaebol with above-median external finance dependence.
CorrCF A chaebol -level asset-weighted cross-member-firm correla-
tion in cash flow suggested by Duchin (2010).
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics on the variables for the sample chaebol firms. It also reports summary
statistics on Net equity transfer for the sample that we use to investigate capital reallocation across chaebol
firms during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. All variables are defined in Table 2.1.
Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Corporate Risk
CF vol 0.0293 0.0302 0.0095 0.0179 0.0364 400
CF vol within a chaebol 0.0000 0.0234 -0.0133 -0.0035 0.0069 400
Idiosyncratic risk 0.0213 0.0221 0.0070 0.0129 0.0265 396
Idiosyncratic risk within a chaebol 0.0000 0.0166 -0.0092 -0.0024 0.0064 396
Systematic risk 0.0104 0.0221 0.0006 0.0054 0.0138 400
Systematic risk within a chaebol 0.0000 0.0243 -0.0103 -0.0017 0.0046 400
Investment
Investment 0.0928 0.1336 0.0065 0.0427 0.1195 392
Other Firm Characteristics
Size 27.4192 1.4675 26.4181 27.4760 28.4962 412
Q 0.9526 0.3114 0.8143 0.8939 0.9826 368
Cash flow 0.0598 0.0474 0.0358 0.0582 0.0833 412
Cash 0.0695 0.0614 0.0271 0.0499 0.0878 396
Debt 0.6326 0.2659 0.4249 0.6119 0.7689 412
Capital Reallocation
Precrisis period, 1996 - 1997
Net equity transfer 0.0115 0.0699 -0.0108 -0.0005 0.0090 45
Postcrisis period, 1998 - 1999
Net equity transfer -0.0037 0.2298 -0.0304 0.0000 0.0184 205
Chaebol-level Risk Variability
Risk variability 0.0220 0.0158 0.0079 0.0193 0.0260 80
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Table 2.3 Risk and Investment before and after the Financial Crisis
This table reports the results of panel regressions on the relationship between risk and investment in chaebol
firms before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. After is an indicator variable for the post-crisis period. All
other variables are defined in Table 2.1. We report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate the significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that investment of higher risk chaebol firms
decreased more after the crisis.
Dep. variable Investment
CF vol 1.1861** 1.1322** 1.1861** 1.1461** 0.9673*** 0.9973**
(2.47) (2.31) (2.39) (2.22) (2.97) (2.45)
After 0.0137 -0.2914
(1.21) (-1.04)
CF vol × After -1.5830*** -1.6622*** -1.5830*** -1.7167*** -1.1934** -1.4152***
(-3.68) (-3.01) (-3.56) (-2.84) (-2.67) (-3.20)
Size 0.0041 0.0048 0.0043
(0.43) (0.49) (0.47)
Size × After 0.0078 0.0071 0.0063
(0.81) (0.74) (0.58)
Q 0.0147 0.0015 -0.0162
(0.42) (0.04) (-0.23)
Q × After 0.0268 0.0497 0.0748
(0.60) (0.88) (0.73)
Cash flow 0.0728 0.1271 0.2039
(0.22) (0.38) (0.68)
Cash flow × After -0.0287 -0.0775 -0.1583
(-0.08) (-0.22) (-0.53)
Cash -0.1972 -0.1858 -0.0303
(-1.44) (-1.33) (-0.25)
Cash × After 0.1318 0.0982 0.0449
(0.66) (0.48) (0.30)
Debt -0.1409 -0.1202 -0.0354
(-1.26) (-1.05) (-0.26)
Debt × After 0.2003* 0.1510 -0.0201
(1.94) (1.48) (-0.14)
Constant 0.0657*** -0.0051 -0.0164 -0.2645 0.0744*** -0.1445
(5.02) (-0.02) (-0.66) (-1.08) (6.02) (-0.61)
Chaebol × Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Chaebol FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 380 363 380 363 380 363
R2 0.0580 0.0894 0.1461 0.1759 0.0284 0.0526
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Table 2.4 Risk and Capital Reallocation Before and After the Asian Crisis
This table presents the relationship between predetermined risk and capital reallocation through
intrachaebol equity investments for the post-crisis period of 1998-1999 (columns (1) and (2)) and for the
pre-crisis period of 1996-1997 (columns (3) and (4)). Following Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015), panels A
and B, respectively, use Industry Q and firm-level Q measured in the year prior to the 1997 crisis (or as
of 1995 for the pre-crisis tests) as a proxy for a firm’s exogenous growth opportunities. All other variables
are defined in Table 2.1. All control variables are measured as of 1997 (or as of 1995 for the pre-crisis
tests). We include chaebol-year fixed effects in all regressions. In each column, we report estimated
coefficients from OLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. This table shows that chaebol used equity transfers to transfer cash to member firms with
low-risk, high-growth opportunities, and high external financing dependence in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis.
Panel A. Using Industry Q as a Control
Dependent variable Net equity transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period Post-crisis (1998-99) Pre-crisis (1996-97)
CF vol -2.0422** -3.2261*** 0.7984 -0.1221
(-2.10) (-2.95) (1.45) (-0.18)








External finance dependence 0.0201** 0.0000
(2.06) (0.99)
Constant 0.0753* -0.6456* -0.0249 -0.0180
(1.68) (-1.98) (-1.39) (-0.10)
Chaebol × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4 (con’t.): Risk and Capital Reallocation Before and After the Asian Crisis
N 143 130 30 28
R2 0.0412 0.1901 0.1491 0.5375
Panel B. Using Firm Q in 1997 as a Control
Dependent variable Net equity transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period Post-crisis (1998-99) Pre-crisis (1996-97)
CF vol -2.0422** -3.3266*** 0.7984 0.7167
(-2.10) (-2.93) (1.45) (0.60)








External finance dependence 0.0230** 0.0000
(2.34) (1.24)
Constant 0.0753* -1.3969*** -0.0249 -0.3311
(1.68) (-3.03) (-1.39) (-0.79)
Chaebol × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 143 126 30 28
R2 0.0412 0.1864 0.1491 0.4668
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Table 2.5 Risk and Investment in Chaebol Firms with High and Low Risk Variability
This table presents the relationship between corporate risk and investments of firms in high and low risk
variability chaebol. High RiskVar Chaebol is an indicator of whether a firm belongs to a chaebol with
above-median risk variability, where risk variability is defined as the standard deviation of corporate risk
across member firms of a chaebol group. After is defined in Table 2.3. All other variables are defined in
Table 2.1. Control variables are size, Q, cash flow, cash, debt, and their interaction terms with After. In
each column, we report estimated coefficients from OLS regression and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that the negative relationship between risk
and investment after the crisis is more pronounced among firms in chaebol with higher variability in risk
across member firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Investment
CF vol 1.1665* 1.1490* 1.1665* 1.1713* 1.0247* 1.0220*
(2.04) (1.86) (1.97) (1.83) (2.06) (1.97)




CF vol -0.9115* -1.1131* -0.9115* -1.1094* -0.6779 -0.7932*
× After (-1.84) (-1.96) (-1.89) (-2.02) (-1.69) (-1.83)
High RiskVar Chaebol 0.0146 0.0094 0.0146 0.0139
× After (0.30) (0.19) (0.29) (0.27)
CF vol 0.0169 -0.0426 0.0169 -0.0484 -0.1010 -0.0439
× High RiskVar Chaebol (0.02) (-0.05) (0.02) (-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.07)
CF vol -1.4156* -1.1310* -1.4156* -1.2616* -1.0661* -1.1696*
× High RiskVar Chaebol (-1.96) (-1.90) (-1.94) (-1.90) (-1.82) (-1.86)
× After
Constant 0.0660*** -0.0057 0.0909*** -0.1546 0.0733*** -0.1336
(5.77) (-0.02) (22.36) (-0.63) (6.18) (-0.58)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Chaebol × Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Chaebol FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 380 363 380 363 380 363
R2 0.0591 0.0900 0.1471 0.1766 0.0297 0.0541
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Table 2.6 Risk and Investments in High- and Low- Liquidity Chaebol Firms
This table presents the relationship between corporate risk and investments of firms in high- and low-
liquidity chaebol. High EFD Chaebol is an indicator of whether the firm belongs to a chaebol with above-
median Rajan and Zingales (1998) external financing dependence measure. After is defined in Table 2.3.
All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. Control variables are size, Q, cash flow, cash, debt, and their
interaction terms with After. We report estimated coefficients from OLS regression and their t-statistics,
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that the negative
relationship between risk and operations after the crisis is more pronounced among firms in chaebol with
high external financing dependence, namely, firms in chaebol with low liquidity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Investment
CF vol 0.7694 0.8030 0.7694 0.7929 1.0571** 1.1139**
(1.37) (1.56) (1.33) (1.26) (2.23) (2.16)




CF vol -0.8734** -1.0519** -0.8734** -1.0493** -0.6452** -0.7666**
× After (-2.32) (-2.16) (-2.25) (-2.11) (-2.21) (-2.32)
High EFD Chaebol 0.0189 0.0124 0.0189 0.0113
× After (0.58) (0.30) (0.56) (0.26)
CF vol 0.8893 0.6922 0.8893 0.7382 -0.2187 -0.2784
× High EFD Chaebol (1.11) (0.76) (1.07) (0.77) (-0.35) (-0.37)
CF vol -1.4844** -1.2511* -1.4844** -1.3716* -1.1280** -1.2220**
× High EFD Chaebol (-2.67) (-1.87) (-2.58) (-2.00) (2.06) (-2.11)
× After
Constant 0.0695*** -0.0161 -0.0122 -0.2702 0.0739*** -0.1426
(5.38) (-0.05) (-0.33) (-1.10) (5.75) (-0.59)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Chaebol × Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Chaebol FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 380 363 380 363 380 363
R2 0.0683 0.0963 0.1555 0.1838 0.0312 0.0550
75
Table 2.7 Risk and Investment for Treated and Control Firms Before and After the Crisis
This table presents the relationship between risk and investments for firms in the treatment and control
groups before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. All chaebol firms constitute the treatment group. The
control group is a subset of nonchaebol firms that are best matched to the chaebol firms based on the
following covariates as of 1997: size, Q, cash flow, cash, debt, investment, investment growth, CF vol, and
industry. To benchmark our results for the sample of all treated and control firms reported in columns
(5) and (6), we also report the relationships for the nontreated group consisting of all nonchaebol firms
(columns (1) and (2)) as well as for the control group firms (columns (3) and (4)). Chaebol is a dummy
variable equal to one for chaebol firms and zero for control firms. After is defined in Table 2.3. Control
variables are size, Q, cash flow, cash, debt, and their interaction terms with After. We use matched control
firms to construct pseudo-chaebol groups to control for counterfactual within-group variations in risk and
investment for nonchaebol firms. We include this pseudo-chaebol- as well as chaebol-year fixed effects to
absorb time-varying group investment trends for both chaebol and nonchaebol firms. We report estimated
coefficients from the regression and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. This table shows that the negative relationship between risk and investment after the crisis
holds for chaebol firms even after controlling for nonchaebol firms.
Dep. variable Investment
Sample
Nontreated Control Treated and control
CF vol 0.3338 0.4313* 0.1737 0.1055 0.1737 0.2683
(1.45) (1.66) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.64)
After 0.0246* 0.0847 0.0556 0.3244 0.0556 0.0112
(1.88) (0.51) (0.58) (0.90) (0.59) (0.04)
CF vol × After -0.4825* -0.5507* 0.2698 0.3273 0.2698 0.3722
(-1.89) (-1.95) (0.36) (0.74) (0.36) (0.62)
CF vol × Chaebol 0.9100 0.8597
(1.45) (1.54)
CF vol -1.6315* -1.7692**
× Chaebol × After (-1.81) (-2.42)
Constant 0.0566*** -0.2375** 0.0345 -0.4570** 0.0438 -0.1855
(5.82) (-1.98) (0.69) (-2.72) (0.90) (-0.78)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Chaebol × Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
N 1,302 1,248 356 356 716 712
R2 0.0101 0.0327 0.0078 0.0854 0.0220 0.0434
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Table 2.8 Investment before and after the Financial Crisis and Placebo Test
Panels A and B report changes in investments around the Asian crisis and around a noncrisis year, respec-
tively, with the results of difference-in-differences tests for treated and control firms. Treated and matched
control groups are defined in Table 2.7. In each panel, we also report the average treatment effects on the
treated firms estimated by the matching procedure. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A shows that chaebol firms reduced their investments to a
significantly lesser extent than similar control non-chaebol firms in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. Panel
B, on the other hand, shows that there is no difference in investment patterns between chaebol and control
firms in the placebo year preceding the 1997 Asian crisis.
Panel A. Investments before and after 1997 Financial Crisis (Treated vs. Control)
1997 1998 1998-1997
Treated Firms 0.1044 0.0849 -0.0195**
(-1.99)
Control Firms 0.1057 0.0454 -0.0603***
(-3.24)
Difference -0.0013 0.0395*** 0.0408**
(t-statistics) (-0.19) (-2.71) (2.18)
Matching estimator 0.0445**
(ATT) (2.27)
Panel B. Investments before and after 1996 (Treated vs. Control)
1996 1997 1997-1996
Treated Firms 0.1291 0.1057 -0.0234**
(-2.09)
Control Firms 0.1093 0.0971 -0.0122*
(-1.91)
Difference 0.0198 0.0086 -0.0112




Table 2.9 Cash-Flow Volatility before and after the Financial Crisis and Placebo Test
Panels A and B report the (pseudo) chaebol-level changes in cash flow volatility around the Asian crisis and
around a noncrisis year, respectively, with the results of difference-in-differences tests for treated (chaebol)
and control (pseudo-chaebol) groups. Treated and matched control (pseudo-chaebol) groups are defined in
Table 2.7. (Pseudo) chaebol-level cash flow volatility is calculated as the asset-weighted average of cash flow
volatility across member firms. In each panel, we also report the average treatment effects on the treated
firms estimated by the matching procedure. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A shows that chaebol groups significantly reduced their overall cash flow
volatility in the aftermath of the Asian crisis while the cash flow volatility of similar control pseudo-chaebol
groups did not change. Panel B, on the other hand, shows that there is no difference in changes in cash
flow volatility between chaebol groups and control pseudo-chaebol groups in the placebo year preceding the
1997 Asian crisis.
Panel A. CF volatility before and after 1997 Financial Crisis (Treated vs. Control)
1997 1998 1998-1997
Chaebol Groups 0.0473 0.0154 -0.0319**
(-2.19)
Pseudo-Chaebol Groups 0.0412 0.0415 0.0003
(0.06)
Difference 0.0061 -0.0261** -0.0322**
(t-statistics) (0.18) (-2.02) (-2.23)
Regression adjustment estimator -0.0322**
(ATT) (-2.29)
Panel B. CF volatility before and after 1996 (Treated vs. Control)
1996 1997 1997-1996
Chaebol Groups 0.0474 0.0473 -0.0000
(-0.00)
Pseudo-Chaebol Groups 0.0427 0.0425 -0.0002
(-0.03)
Difference 0.0047 0.0048 0.0002
(t-statistics) (0.40) (0.41) (0.00)
Regression adjustment estimator 0.0002
(ATT) (0.04)
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Table 2.10 Corporate Risk and Investment Opportunity, Cash Flow, and Debt Growth
This table reports the results of panel regressions on the relationship between cash flow volatility (CF
vol) and investment opportunity (Q), cash flow (Cash flow), and debt growth (Debt growth) before and
after the Asian crisis. After is defined in Table 2.3. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. We
include chaebol-year fixed effects in all regressions to absorb time-varying chaebol trends in investment
opportunity, cash flow, and debt growth. We report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that there is no evidence of
greater investment opportunity, higher cash flow, or larger growth in debt for low-risk-chaebolfirms than
for high-risk-chaebol firms in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
Dep. variable Q Cash flow Debt growth
CF vol 0.4354 0.4408 0.0978 0.1427 0.4137 1.0796
(0.94) (1.00) (0.47) (0.61) (0.40) (0.81)
CF vol × After 0.5661 0.7277 0.1946 0.1910 -0.6070 -1.1425
(0.76) (0.88) (1.10) (0.95) (-0.32) (-0.57)
Size -0.0104 0.0026 0.0584*
(-1.20) (0.68) (2.02)




Q × After -0.0187 -0.1696
(-1.30) (-0.58)
Cash flow 0.0411 -1.7971
(0.16) (-1.17)
Cash flow × After -0.6732* 0.4885
(-1.75) (0.29)
Cash -0.0600 0.0209 1.8426*
(-0.26) (0.25) (1.90)




Debt × After -0.0077 -0.0105
(-0.03) (-0.32)
Constant 0.8637*** 0.8496*** 0.0502*** 0.0511 -0.0405 -0.0200
(55.23) (4.29) (5.86) (0.46) (-1.27) (-0.03)
Chaebol × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 365 365 398 365 391 358
R2 0.0813 0.1064 0.0432 0.0661 0.0042 0.0672
79
Table 2.11 Placebo Tests on the Relationship between Risk and Investment
This table presents the results of panel regressions on the relationship between risk and investment of
chaebol firms during normal periods, i.e., two noncrisis periods around 1995 and 2005, or during an economic
downturn period without financial turmoil, i.e., the 2003 credit card crisis. After is a dummy variable for
the two later years of the four years of each sample period. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1.
We report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by chaebol. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,




Around 1995 Around 2005 2003 Credit Card Crisis
CF vol 0.1648 0.0069 -0.0767 -0.0471 0.2119 0.2943
(0.47) (0.02) (-1.00) (-0.60) (0.68) (0.95)
CF vol × After 0.1689 0.2557 0.0234 0.0043 -0.0965 -0.1192
(0.28) (0.53) (0.29) (0.05) (-0.35) (-0.41)
Size 0.0025 0.0049*** 0.0085
(0.85) (3.48) (1.09)
Size × After 0.0046 -0.0060** -0.0035
(0.80) (-2.30) (-0.43)
Q -0.0057 0.0113 -0.0029
(-0.24) (1.19) (-0.22)
Q × After 0.0526 -0.0038 0.0111
(1.02) (-0.41) (0.52)
Cash flow -0.1191 -0.0292 0.2656*
(-0.86) (-0.47) (2.04)
Cash flow × After -0.2749* 0.0124 -0.2634
(-1.94) (0.14) (-1.52)
Cash -0.1701* -0.1081* -0.0172
(-1.84) (-1.78) (-0.20)
Cash × After -0.0591 0.0343 0.0032
(-0.44) (0.46) (0.03)
Debt -0.0523** 0.0137 0.1249**
(-2.41) (0.34) (2.74)
Debt × After -0.0258 -0.0079 -0.0936*
(-0.33) (-0.16) (-2.01)
Constant 0.0361*** -0.0767 0.0108*** -0.0491 0.0033 -0.1810**
(7.20) (-0.78) (4.71) (-1.61) (0.73) (-2.37)
Chaebol × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 318 275 388 384 344 338
R2 0.0051 0.0437 0.0113 0.0613 0.0275 0.1094
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Table 2.12 Decomposed Risk and Investment before and after the Financial Crisis
Panels A and B of this table report the results of panel regressions on the relationship between
idiosyncratic and systematic corporate risk, respectively, and investment of chaebol firms before and after
the Asian crisis. We report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows that investment of higher
idiosyncratic risk chaebol firms decreased to a significantly greater extent during the crisis while there is
no such relationship in the case of systematic risk.
Panel A. Relationship between Idiosyncratic Risk and Investment
Dep. variable Investment
Idio. Risk 0.8067 0.8299 0.8067 0.8548 0.7646* 0.8241**
(1.50) (1.58) (1.45) (1.59) (1.92) (2.07)
After 0.0074 -0.3517
(0.63) (-1.08)
Idio. Risk × After -1.8621** -2.0764*** -1.8621** -2.1027*** -1.8779** -2.0111***
(-2.61) (-3.09) (-2.52) (-2.95) (-2.71) (-3.11)
Size 0.0015 0.0021 0.0019
(0.14) (0.19) (0.19)
Size × After 0.0097 0.0093 0.0080
(0.91) (0.85) (0.72)
Q 0.0127 -0.0005 -0.0159
(0.36) (-0.01) (-0.24)
Q × After 0.0250 0.0461 0.0745
(0.71) (1.05) (0.81)
Cash flow 0.1566 0.2094 0.3039
(0.44) (0.58) (0.91)
Cash flow × After -0.1110 -0.1620 -0.2518
(-0.31) (-0.45) (-0.82)
Cash -0.2184 -0.2068 -0.0600
(-1.39) (-1.28) (-0.43)
Cash × After 0.1156 0.0849 0.0624
(0.55) (0.40) (0.40)
Debt -0.1631 -0.1433 -0.0501
(-1.45) (-1.28) (-0.38)
Debt × After 0.2450** 0.1987* 0.0203
(2.41) (2.04) (0.16)
Constant 0.0847*** 0.0870 0.0186 -0.1889 0.0897*** -0.0920
(6.46) (0.27) (0.60) (-0.78) (7.69) (-0.39)
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Table 2.12 (con’t.): Decomposed Risk and Investment before and after the Financial
Crisis
Chaebol × Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Chaebol FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 376 363 376 363 376 363
R2 0.0417 0.0813 0.1313 0.1675 0.0257 0.0503
Panel B. Relationship between Systematic Risk and Investment
Dep. variable Investment
Sys. Risk 0.4875 0.5193 0.4875 0.4909 0.4896 0.5148
(1.52) (1.19) (1.53) (1.18) (1.61) (1.25)
After -0.0338 -0.5495
(-1.58) (-1.52)
Sys. Risk × After 0.1475 0.1088 0.1475 0.1143 0.1452 0.1102
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.38) (0.30) (0.29)
Size -0.0018 -0.0013 0.0019
(-0.16) (-0.11) (0.20)
Size × After 0.0177 0.0174 0.0103
(1.45) (1.41) (0.80)
Q 0.0421 0.0312 0.0291
(1.08) (0.85) (0.63)
Q × After -0.0359** -0.0168 0.0063
(-2.29) (-0.87) (0.10)
Cash flow 0.0542 0.1021 0.1804
(0.14) (0.27) (0.54)
Cash flow × After -0.1090 -0.1522 -0.2429
(-0.27) (-0.39) (-0.72)
Cash -0.1745 -0.1670 -0.0067
(-1.10) (-1.05) (-0.05)
Cash × After 0.1196 0.0918 0.0640
(0.53) (0.41) (0.46)
Debt -0.1573 -0.1409 -0.0584
(-1.29) (-1.21) (-0.46)
Debt × After 0.2038* 0.1610* -0.0022
(2.02) (1.77) (-0.02)
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Table 2.12 (con’t.): Decomposed Risk and Investment before and after the Financial
Crisis
Constant 0.0312** 0.0928 0.0145*** -0.1876 0.0855*** -0.1292
(2.61) (0.29) (5.83) (-0.80) (26.17) (-0.56)
Chaebol × Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Chaebol FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 380 363 380 363 380 363
R2 0.1340 0.1698 0.1211 0.1532 0.0204 0.0397
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CHAPTER 3
THE DARK SIDE OF INSIDER OWNERSHIP
3.1 Introduction
Stock ownership by corporate insiders is a central feature of modern corporate governance.
The impact of insider stock ownership on firm value is, however, ambiguous. On the one
hand, stock ownership exposes insiders to stock prices and thus gives them an incentive to
maximize firm value. Insider stock ownership can thereby reduce agency costs that result
from the separation of ownership and control in public firms (e.g., Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). This is the bright side of insider ownership.
On the other hand, there might be costs that offset the benefits of significant insider
ownership. High levels of ownership provide insiders with voting rights, which can result
in entrenchment and thus enable the insider to waste corporate resources in the pursuit
of his or her private benefits (e.g., Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983)). This
is the dark side of insider ownership. In their seminal paper, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) document a significant non-monotone relation between management ownership and
market valuation of a firm, as measured by Tobin’s Q: Q first increases, then declines, and
finally rises slightly as management’s ownership share increases.
We introduce a new cost of insider ownership. We hypothesize that if a firm’s shareholder
base is heterogenous, and the interest of the insider is aligned with that of the minority
group, then higher insider ownership can result in value-destroying actions because it in-
creases the likelihood of adopting policies that benefit the minority group at the expense of
the majority group. We call this the minority-alignment hypothesis. Importantly, insider
ownership is the cause of this inefficiency: This cost would not exist if the insider’s stock
ownership were zero.1
1This effect of ownership is different from that of entrenchment, where increased insider ownership merely
further enables agency problems that are already there (e.g., consumption of private benefits).
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A necessary condition for this situation to arise is that the interests of various groups
of shareholders differ and may conflict. In general, any corporate decision which has
consequences that depend on investor characteristics will have a heterogenous effect on
a firm’s investors. For example, “clientele effects” due to tax differences across investors
have been shown to affect payout policy (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown, Liang, and
Weisbenner (2007), and Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner (2011)). Further, shareholders
can derive private benefits from corporate decisions, as, for example, in the case of union
pension funds (e.g., Agrawal (2012)).
The minority-alignment hypothesis implies that if an insider is mis-aligned with the
majority of shareholders in a firm and faces a decision which will impact shareholders
differentially, higher insider ownership can play a negative role. To test the minority-
alignment hypothesis, we would ideally like to identify companies that are in a position to
make significant discrete decisions whereby the interests of distinct groups of shareholders
are not aligned. We would also like to be able to identify the interests of these distinct
shareholder groups as well as the interests of the insiders. The firms’ actions would need
to be observable and the valuation effects measurable.
Analyzing this hypothesis is empirically challenging. Measuring the impact of firms’
decisions on value is often difficult because these decisions (and their timing) may be
unobservable or difficult to distinguish from other decisions (e.g., if they take place over a
long period). As a result, it is often impossible, using standard event study methodologies,
to draw inference about the valuation implications of these decisions, for example, using
standard event study methodologies, is often impossible. In addition, a firm’s shareholder
base (e.g., tax-exempt vs. taxable), incentive structure (e.g., compensation contracts), and
decisions are endogenously determined.
This paper exploits a unique natural experiment to test whether the minority-alignment
problem affects corporate decisions and whether this effect has negative consequences.
Barack Obama’s re-election in November 2012 as the president of the United States was
followed by a period of immense fiscal uncertainty during which the country approached
what was known as the “fiscal cliff.” As part of the fiscal cliff, many temporary tax cuts
were set to expire so that several tax rates would revert to higher levels. One of the tax
rates that was set to revert was the personal income tax on dividends, which was expected
to increase from a maximum federal rate of 15% to a maximum rate of 43.4%. Despite
ongoing negotiations in Congress over these tax increases, it was widely expected during
the final months of 2012 that dividend income would face higher taxes. Thus, companies
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had less than seven weeks to pay out dividends at the current tax rate.2
As a result, many companies rushed to pay out large special dividends before the tax
rates were expected to increase. For example, in December, Costco paid out an extra
dividend of $7 per share, and Las Vegas Sands paid out an extra $2.75 per share, both
payouts representing around 7% of the market capitalization of these firms.
This situation had a heterogenous impact in how various groups of shareholders were
to be affected by the anticipated tax increase. Many of these firms had a majority of
shareholders that were exempt from individual dividend taxes. For example, Costco had
high institutional ownership (around 80%) and most of these institutions are not subject
to individual dividend taxes. For these shareholders, the anticipated increase in dividend
taxes was of no consequence. Other shareholders, in particular taxable shareholders, (in-
cluding insiders) are affected by dividend taxes and had much to gain from special dividend
payments. For example, Steve Wynn who owned 10% of Wynn Resorts reportedly stood
to save more than $20 million in taxes on the dividend being paid out before the end of
the year.3
For such shareholders, the optimal response is to shift future dividends forward to 2012,
in order to save on taxes, even if these payments would have a negative impact on their
respective firms. Taxable shareholders could be better off if their firms were to pay out
dividends now, even if that causes the present value of all pre-tax payouts to decrease. A
negative effect on the present value of pre-tax payouts would hurt tax-exempt investors.
Because insiders are subject to individual taxes, their tax preferences are naturally
aligned with that of other taxable shareholders. Therefore, the higher the proportion
of tax-exempt shareholders (e.g., pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, etc.) in a firm,
the greater the misalignment between insiders and the firm’s investor base for decisions that
involve taxes. Moreover, the higher insider ownership, the stronger the insider’s incentive
to take action that benefits him or her as a taxable shareholder.
Thus, this environment is suitable for testing the minority-alignment hypothesis. First,
the payout incentives of insiders and tax-exempt investors differ. Second, firms had to
decide and act on whether to pay out additional dividends within a short time period, and
2Even though the fiscal cliff had been foreseen, the likelihood that dividend tax rates would go up
increased significantly during the final months of 2012. For example, if Mitt Romney had been elected
instead of Barack Obama, he had vowed not to let tax rates rise. The evidence also suggests that few firms
acted to pay out additional dividends in the months before the election date, indicating that the election
outcome indeed played a significant role in determining firms’ decision to pay special dividends.
3New York Times, November 18, 2012 “Investors Rush to Beat Threat of Higher Taxes”
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we can identify which firms chose to pay out extra dividends. Third, we can measure the
valuation implications of paying out these special dividends by calculating the abnormal
returns around the special dividend announcements. Finally, the anticipated change in the
tax code was significant (from 15% to 43.4%), which means that these decisions had large
value implications.
We examine firms’ decisions on whether to pay a special dividend in anticipation of the
tax rate change during the period November 2012-December 2012, as well as the valuation
effects of these decisions. We identify over 160 special dividend announcements between the
presidential election on November 6, 2012 and the resolution of the fiscal cliff on January 1,
2013 (hereafter called the event period). The aggregate amount of these special dividends
was around $16 billion, and the number of special dividends during this period was 13
times larger compared with the same period in 2011.
We find that firms with higher insider ownership were more likely to pay a special
dividend during the event period. However, the choice as to whether to pay a special
dividend is not significantly associated with the fraction of non-taxable (institutional)
shareholders in the firm. Notably, firms in which insiders have a lower personal stake in
the payout decision (i.e., firms with low insider ownership) do respond to the investor base,
and are less likely to announce special dividends when the firm has a greater proportion of
non-taxable shareholders. Thus, firms with high insider ownership are less responsive to
whether the firm has many taxable as opposed to non-taxable shareholders. This evidence
is consistent with the minority-alignment hypothesis.
The minority-alignment hypothesis also implies a negative association between the degree
of misalignment and the valuation consequences of decisions made by insiders. In the
context of the anticipated dividend tax rate increase, payout decisions made by insiders in
firms with a larger fraction of taxable as opposed to non-taxable investors combined with
high ownership by insiders should have worse valuation implications.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the abnormal returns around the special dividend an-
nouncement date were the lowest among firms with high insider ownership combined with
high ownership by non-taxable investors. In contrast, the highest abnormal returns were
among firms with high insider ownership combined with high ownership by taxable in-
vestors. Thus, when insiders’ interests are aligned with a larger (smaller) fraction of the
firm’s shareholders, payout decisions made by insiders during the event period are associ-
ated with higher (lower) abnormal returns.
The main methodological advantage of looking at announcement returns around these
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special dividend announcements is that the information about the ownership structure
that we use in the regressions is pre-determined and observable to investors and therefore
is reflected in prices before the special dividend announcement. As a result, even though
ownership structure is not randomly assigned, we do not have endogeneity concerns that
might bias these estimates.
Given the large size of these special dividend payments, we finally examine how these
payments affected the firms’ cash reserves and future payouts. We find that these special
dividend payments were followed by large drops in cash reserves, but that the firms re-
plenished their cash within the following quarter. Firms that paid special dividends did
not change their regular dividend payments, but they did reduce share repurchases in the
subsequent quarter.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, the study is related to the
agency theory literature that studies the role of insider ownership in incentive provision
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy (1998)). To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to introduce this novel cost of insider ownership. This cost is
most evident when high insider ownership aligns incentives of an insider with the interests
of only a small fraction of shareholders. Importantly, insider ownership is the source of the
cost, as this cost would not exist if the insider’s stock ownership were zero. This cost might
be present in several other settings, such as when insiders exhibit different time discounting
or risk tolerance from that of other investors.
Second, the paper is related to studies that examine the relationship between taxes,
payout policy, and insider ownership. Previous papers on the response of dividend policy
to tax rate changes (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007),
and Hanlon and Hoopes (2014)) have found that firms’ payout policies tend to respond
more strongly to tax changes when a firm has high insider ownership. We contribute to
this literature by examining the valuation effects of these decisions, and, in particular, we
ask whether firms with higher insider ownership make better or worse decisions. We can
thus also distinguish whether the stronger response by insiders is good for investors or not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and summary
statistics. Section 3.3 studies determinants of special dividend payments. Section 3.4
reports the valuation implications of special dividends. Section 3.5 reports the effects of
special dividends on future outcomes. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Sample Description
Data for this study were compiled from several sources. We obtained data on special
dividends from Capital IQ, and firm-level accounting information from Compustat. Stock
returns and prices came from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Data on
institutional common stock holdings and insider ownership were obtained from Thomson-
Reuters.
The sample was constructed as follows. First, we collected data on all special dividend
payments announced between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012. The sample ex-
cludes dividends that were scheduled to be paid in 2013. The data from Capital IQ includes
the special dividend announcement date and the dividend amount. Second, we merged the
sample with daily stock return data from CRSP and firm characteristics from Compustat.
Firm characteristics were measured at the end of fiscal year 2011. Finally, we merged these
data with institutional ownership and insider ownership data from Thomson-Reuters. The
final sample consists of a cross-section of 3,361 firms. Table 3.1 describes variables used in
the paper.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sample and Panel B reports summary
statistics for the subsample of firms that announced a special dividend in November and
December of 2012 (‘the event period’). While 4.82% of firms made a special dividend
announcement during the event period, only 0.36% made a special dividend announcement
during the same period in 2011.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the pattern of special dividend announcements during July-December
of 2011 and the same period in 2012. The dark area shows the cumulative number of spe-
cial dividend announcements during these months in 2011, and the grey area shows the
same for 2012. We see that special dividend announcements in both years accelerate in
November and early December. However, in 2012, the acceleration in special dividend
announcements towards the end of the year is many times more pronounced.
Several pieces of evidence are consistent with these dividend payments being motivated
by anticipated higher taxes. Table 3.3 lists media excerpts from a sample of these an-
nouncements. Many of these announcements explicitly mention anticipated higher taxes
as the main reason for the special dividend payments.
Second, the average dividend-to-asset ratio is 0.9% across the full sample. Within the
sample of firms that announced a special dividend payment the dividend-to-asset ratio is
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2.22%. Thus, firms that announced a special dividend have a stronger ex-ante reason to
react to the anticipated increase in the dividend tax rate because they make more use of
dividends in general.
Finally, marginal investors in the firms that announced special dividends are also likely
to face higher dividend tax rates. The median stock price drop (as a fraction of the size
of prior dividends within the last five years) on the ex-dividend date is 0.82 across the full
sample. When we consider the sample of firms that announced a special dividend, we find
that the median stock price drop on ex-dividend dates is 0.69. This evidence indicates that
in the sample of firms that announced a special dividend, the marginal investor faces a
higher dividend tax rate.
Table 3.2 also shows that the average (median) special dividend announcement-date
CAR is 2.42% (1.49%), suggesting that the decision to pay a special dividend on average
had a positive impact on firm value. The average (median) direct insider ownership is
4.48% (1.70%) across the full sample. Within the sample of firms that announced a special
dividend, the average (median) direct insider ownership is 7.88% (4.42%). Thus, compared
with the full sample, companies that announced a special dividend during the event period
exhibit higher insider ownership.
Overall, these results are consistent with the anticipated increase in the special dividend
tax rate being the main reason for the special dividend announcement.
3.3 Determinants of Special Dividend Payments
Following the presidential election of 2012, many firms rushed to pay out large special div-
idends in anticipation of a dividend tax increase in 2013. We begin by studying which firm
characteristics and ownership characteristics predict which firms are likely to make special
dividend payments during the event period (November-December 2012). In particular, we
seek to analyze whether firms with higher insider ownership (involving shareholders who
are personally subject to dividend taxes) are more likely to pay special dividends during
this period, and whether firms where institutions own a larger fraction of shares (involv-
ing shareholders who do not pay dividend taxes and thus would be unaffected by a tax
increase) are less likely to make these tax-motivated dividend payments.
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We thus estimate the following cross-sectional linear probability model:
Speciali = α+ β1InsiderOwnershipi + β2InstOwnershipi (3.1)
+ β3InsiderOwnershipi ∗ InstOwnershipi + β4Xi + ηj + εi,
where Speciali is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announced a special dividend
during the event period. InsiderOwnership is the proportion of shares directly owned by
the firm’s executives and directors. InstOwnership is the proportion of shares owned by
institutional investors (excluding mutual funds). X is a vector of control variables. The
control variables are stock returns over the past five years, size, an indicator for whether
the firm has repurchased shares during the prior year, the ratio of total dividend payments
to assets, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of financial constraints, and the ratio of
cash to assets. All control variables are measured as of the end of 2011. ηj are industry
fixed effects based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification.
We exclude the fraction of shares held by mutual funds from institutional ownership,
because a majority of investors in mutual funds do pay dividend taxes. The share of
institutional investors is thus a measure of the proportion of a firm’s investors that are not
affected by changes in dividend taxes. Table 3.4 shows that institutional ownership (net
of mutual funds) is a valid proxy for dividend tax preferences of a firm’s investors. The
table shows that the average stock price drop on ex-dividend dates as a fraction of the
dividend (measured around all ex-dividend dates between October 2010 and September
2012) is lower among firms with low institutional ownership (0.717) than among firms with
high institutional ownership (0.9965) (the difference is also statistically significant), which
suggests that a high fraction of institutional ownership is a good proxy for a lower tax rate
for the firm’s marginal investors (Elton and Gruber (1970)).
The results from regression (3.1) are presented in Panel A of Table 3.5. In columns (1)
and (3), the coefficient on InsiderOwnership is positive and statistically significant at the
1 % level. This evidence shows that firms with higher insider ownership were more likely to
pay out special dividends in anticipation of a dividend tax increase. Specifically, the result
in column (1) indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in insider ownership (7.48%)
is associated with a 2.15 percentage point increase in the likelihood of paying a special
dividend. This effect is large compared with the unconditional probability of announcing
a special dividend during this period, which was 4.88%. This result is consistent with
evidence from past tax reforms on the relationship between insiders and firms’ payout
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response to changes in dividend tax rates (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown, Liang, and
Weisbenner (2007), and Hanlon and Hoopes (2014)).
Columns (2) and (3) nevertheless show that a decision to pay a special dividend during
this period is on average not related to the tax incentives of a firm’s investor base. This
result is evident from the coefficient on the fraction of institutional ownership, which is
not significant. In other words, while differences in insiders’ tax incentives do matter for
a payout decision, the tax incentives of the firm’s investor base do not. In sum, in making
these special dividend payout decisions, firms were (on average) not responsive to the tax
preferences of their investors.
In column (4), we further interact insider ownership with institutional ownership. This
column shows that the result that there is no relationship on average between special
dividends in this period and the tax incentives of the investor base is driven mainly by
firms with high insider ownership. Specifically, when we include the interaction term, we
see that the coefficient on institutional ownership becomes negative. This means that when
insider ownership is low, the tax incentives of the investor base are associated with paying
a special dividend during the event period, as we would expect if investors’ taxes matter for
payout policy. Among these firms, higher institutional ownership makes it less likely that
a firm will make a special dividend payment. For example, firms with insider ownership at
the 25th percentile (0.56%) are less likely to pay special dividends the more their investor
base is made up of institutional investors (in column (3), 0.56%*1.3864-0.0434<0). So
when the insider has little or no personal stake in the decision on whether to pay a special
dividend before the anticipated tax increase, the firm is more responsive to shareholders’
tax incentives. However, as the insider ownership share increases, the firm becomes less
responsive to the tax incentives of the investor base and increasingly responsive to insiders’
own tax incentives. Columns (5) and (6) further show that these results are robust to
controlling for industry fixed effects as well as other firm characteristics.
As a placebo test, Panel B shows the results of the same regression for special dividend
payments made between January and September 2012. These results show that there is no
significant economic or statistical relationship between special dividend payout decisions
in these other times and the ownership variables we study. This supports the conclusion
whereby the results in Panel A are specifically driven by insiders’ and other investors’ tax
incentives, and not driven by, for example, unobserved omitted variables that are correlated
with both these ownership variables and the special dividend payouts.
Importantly, because firms had a limited period of time during which to decide whether
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to make special dividend payments or not, this setting alleviates potential concerns about
endogenous changes in ownership structure before the special dividend announcement date.
To examine whether insiders changed their ownership in anticipation of these tax changes
or special dividend payments, Table 3.6 examines the ratio of insider selling to buying in
a difference-in-difference test between firms that paid special dividends and other firms,
before and after the presidential election. This evidence shows that there were no important
differences in the relative selling and buying behavior of insiders between firms that paid
special dividends and those that did not in the months before and after the presidential
election in November.
Overall, we show that a firm’s ownership structure is associated with whether the firm
responds to an anticipated dividend tax increase. Firms with high insider ownership re-
spond more strongly to anticipated changes in tax rates. But such a response is not related
to the tax incentives of the investor base, which is inconsistent with a tax clientele hypoth-
esis that would predict that higher institutional ownership should be negatively related
with paying tax-motivated special dividends. Furthermore, the zero average relationship
with the investor base is entirely driven by firms with high insider ownership. By contrast,
among firms in which insider ownership is low (and thus insiders have smaller personal
stakes in payout decisions), special dividend payouts do respond to the composition of the
investor base.
In sum, these results are consistent with insiders’ personal tax incentives being the
principal driver of firms’ special payout decisions around tax changes, and that increasing
insider ownership makes firms less responsive to the tax incentives of their investor bases.
3.4 Special Dividends: Valuation Implications
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section we study the valuation implications of the special dividend payments made
during the event period (November-December 2012). As discussed in the introduction,
the principal reason behind these payments was to make significant payouts before an
anticipated dividend tax increase. To measure the valuation implications, we employ an
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event study methodology and estimate the following regression:
CARspecial,i = α+ β1InsiderOwnershipi + β2InstOwnershipi (3.2)
+ β3InsiderOwnershipi × InstOwnershipi + ηj + εi,
where CARspecial,i is the cumulative abnormal return over three trading days [-1, +1]
around firm i’s special dividend announcement and ηj are industry fixed effects. The
definitions of the ownership variables are the same as in the previous sections.
This regression seeks to answer the following questions. Did the reaction to these special
dividends depend on the alignment of tax preferences between a firm’s insiders and its
other investors? Specifically, if tax preferences are not aligned, did higher insider own-
ership result in lower abnormal returns around the special dividend announcements? Or
conversely, if tax preferences are aligned (i.e., insiders and most shareholders have similar
tax preferences), do the abnormal returns increase with higher insider ownership?
The main methodological advantage of looking at announcement returns around these
special dividend announcements is that the information about the ownership structure
that we use in the regressions is pre-determined and observable to investors and therefore
is reflected in prices before the special dividend announcement. As a result, even though
ownership structure is not randomly assigned, we do not have endogeneity concerns that
might bias these estimates.
Whereas previous research has shown that payout policy decisions depend on the tax
preferences of insiders and investors (Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown, Liang, and Weis-
benner (2007)), these studies do not study whether decisions to change dividend payout
policy in response to tax changes have any valuation consequences.4 To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the valuation implications of tax-motivated
payout decisions using an event study methodology. Importantly, this methodology allows
us to study not only whether the decision to pay out special dividends has positive or
negative consequences on average, but also whether the valuation implications depend on
the ownership structure and the tax alignment between insiders and other investors.
In contrast to previous changes in dividend tax rates, firms had a limited period of time
4Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) exploited a sequence of eight legislative events surrounding the
2003 dividend tax cut. They find that the stock price reaction was higher for firms with high individual
ownership and high dividends-to-assets ratio. They could not, however, perform the event study analysis
to study the valuation implications of changes in dividend payout policy because firms implemented these
changes by only gradually raising dividends over time.
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during which to respond to the impending tax change and needed to make discrete and
large dividend payments if they wanted to take advantage of the existing low tax rate.
The reason behind this urgency was that the presidential candidates had opposite views
on whether dividend taxes should increase. As a result, there was considerable uncertainty
about the future dividend tax rate until the very end of the presidential campaign. After the
election outcome, a dividend tax increase at the end of the year became widely expected,
and firms therefore had less than two months to take advantage of the existing low tax
rates. In contrast to the dividend tax decrease of 2003, firms did not have the option of
gradually changing their payout policy, but needed to make large discrete payments within
a short window of time. The discrete and observable nature of these decisions allows us to
employ the event study methodology.
3.4.2 Event study results
In this section we report the event study results from estimating equation (3.2). Table 3.7
reports the results.
Column (1) shows that the level of insider ownership did not (on average) affect the
valuation implications of the payout decision. However, this result is unconditional on the
firm’s investors’ tax preferences. As we show below, this unconditional result masks two
opposite effects of insider ownership.
In Columns (2) and (3) we show that insider ownership does matter for the valuation
implications of these special dividends if we also consider the investor base. We do so by
interacting insider ownership with institutional ownership. The purpose of this interaction
is to test whether stronger alignment between insiders’ and shareholders’ tax incentives
is associated with more efficient dividend payout decisions. We find that when there is a
smaller fraction of non-taxable investors (as measured by institutional ownership less mu-
tual fund ownership), higher insider ownership is associated with higher abnormal returns
around the special dividend announcements. The coefficient of Insider Ownership in col-
umn (2) indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in insider ownership (7.84%) is
associated with a 0.48% (7.48%*6.15%) higher cumulative abnormal return. In these firms,
the insiders’ tax preferences are aligned with a larger fraction of investors. Therefore, be-
cause higher insider ownership is going to make the insider care more about maximizing
the value of the payout decision, it results in higher value among firms with mainly taxable
investors. These payout decisions are thus better received by the market. This is the bright
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side of insider ownership.
The interaction term shows the dark side of insider ownership. The worst valuation con-
sequences of special dividend payments in this period were for firms that had a combination
of high insider ownership and high institutional ownership, i.e., where the tax misalign-
ment was the highest and insiders also had a strong reason to personally care about the
decision. If a firm has many non-taxed (institutional) investors, higher insider ownership is
associated with lower abnormal returns around these special dividend announcements. For
example, column (2) shows that the valuation consequences of these special dividends as we
increase insider ownership is predicted to turn negative when institutional ownership rises
above 27% (0.0615/0.2271), which is below the median (36.6%) of non-taxable ownership
among the special dividend payers in our sample.
These results show that having misaligned tax incentives between insiders and the in-
vestor base results in lower valuation consequences of these special dividends. In Panel B
of Table 3.7, we show the results of testing whether these payouts were more likely to have
negative consequences, or whether they were merely less positive. We employ the same
independent variables as in equation 3.2, but replace the dependent variable (CAR) with
an indicator of a negative CAR.
We find strong support for the special dividend payments being more likely to result
in negative stock market reactions when tax incentives are misaligned. This result is
evident in the coefficient of the interaction between insider ownership and institutional
ownership. Among firms with low institutional ownership and high insider ownership (when
tax incentives are aligned), the stock market reactions are less likely to be negative (the
bright side of insider ownership). But as institutional ownership increases, the relation
between higher insider ownership and the probability of a negative return around these
special dividend announcements also increases (the dark side of insider ownership). As in
Panel A, the predicted valuation consequence of higher insider ownership turns negative
around the median level of institutional ownership.
Overall, we find that differences in insider ownership (which makes up a small fraction
of total ownership) have a large impact on both the probability that a firm reacts to
tax changes and the valuation implications for firms that do react. That is, while insider
ownership in most firms is a small fraction of total shares (median 1.7%), it has a big impact
on firm’s response to changes in dividend tax rates. Further, the stronger response is not
always in the interest of shareholders. In contrast, non-taxable institutions own a large
fraction of shares outstanding in many firms and should be important in determining firms’
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payout policies. But we show that the investor base plays only a weak role on average in
determining firms’ responsiveness to dividend tax changes. Finally, when firms have high
insider ownership and high non-taxable ownership, the payout decisions in response to
the anticipated tax change are on average less efficient and more likely to have negative
valuation consequences.
3.5 Special dividends and payout policy
We now turn to examining whether the large special dividend payouts firms made before
the fiscal cliff were associated with changes in future payouts. In particular, we hypothesize
that these special dividend payments were followed by reductions in payouts and reductions
in firms’ cash levels.
To examine this question we analyze the following difference-in-difference regression:
yi,t = α+ β1IPaidSpecial,i + β2EventPeriodt + β3PostPeriodt (3.3)
+ β4IPaidSpecial,i × EventPeriodt + β5IPaidSpecial,i × PostPeriodt + ηj + εit,
where yit are our dependent variables (dividends, repurchases, and cash, all normalized by
lagged assets, measured quarterly). IPaidSpecial,i is an indicator equal to one if the firm
announced a special dividend during the event period. To analyze changes in payouts over
time, we include indicators for the EventPeriod (specifically, the fiscal quarter that includes
at least November of 2012) and PostPeriod (the first two quarters after the event period), as
well as interactions of these period indicators with IPaidSpecial,i. The baseline time period
(omitted category) is the last quarter preceding the event period. We also include firm
fixed effects (ηj) in some regressions, which subsume IPaidSpecial,i when included. Table
3.8 presents the results.
Column (1) shows that firms that paid special dividends before the fiscal cliff also had
a higher level of baseline dividend payments; specifically, they paid 0.31% more of assets
in dividends than other firms in the pre-event period. Firms that paid special dividends in
the event period increased their total dividend payments between the pre-period and event
period more than firms that did not pay any special dividends (the diff-in-diff between
the pre-period and event period is 2.54% of assets). However, in the post period, the
firms that had paid special dividends in the event period actually reduced their dividends
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more (compared to what they did in the pre-event period) than the firms that did not pay
special dividends. These results show that there was some substitution of dividends over
time among the special dividend payers—so that the firms that paid special dividends in
November and December subsequently reduced dividends in later months. However, while
this substitution is statistically significant, it is nevertheless economically quite small—
around 0.05-0.07% of assets—compared with the special dividends that these firms paid
that were, on average, more than 2% of assets.
Columns (3) and (4) further show that the special dividend payers also cut future re-
purchases. While there is no relative change in repurchases in the event period between
special dividend payers and the firms that did not pay a special dividend, the coefficient on
IPaidSpecial,i × PostPeriod shows that the firms that paid special dividends subsequently
reduced repurchases by more than the firms that did not pay special dividends. This result
is thus evidence of substitution between the tax-motivated special dividends and future
repurchases.
This substitution result is also different from that observed around previous tax changes:
Chetty and Saez (2005) find that firms that increased dividends after the dividend tax de-
crease in 2003 did not reduce repurchases. Also Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2013) point out that
the longer-term evidence following the 2003 tax change is inconsistent with tax-motivated
substitution between repurchases and dividends, as repurchases have continued to increase
throughout the last decade. Of course, while we find evidence of short-term substitution
(quarter to quarter) between dividends and repurchases, it remains to be seen to what ex-
tent these special dividend payments also will have a longer-term impact on total payouts.
One possible concern when testing substitution is that the choice as to whether to pay out
special dividends is endogenous. For example, an alternative explanation for our substitu-
tion result could be that the firms that paid out special dividends would have reduced their
repurchases anyway, even absent making these special dividend payments. While this story
is difficult to rule out, we see no relative changes in repurchases until exactly the quarter
after these firms paid out special dividends. Such short-term substitution alleviates the
concern that a potential time-varying omitted variable could be driving these results.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we analyze the changes in cash holdings around the
event period. We find that while cash levels are lower in the quarter of the special dividend
payments, we surprisingly find no evidence of relatively lower cash holdings one quarter
later (the coefficient on IPaidSpecial,i×PostPeriod is economically small and insignificant).5
5There is nevertheless a downward trend in the uninteracted period indicators, which shows that cash is
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This result implies that firms that paid out special dividends replenished their cash levels
remarkably quickly, as they accumulated additional cash of around 3% of assets within the
two quarters compared with the non-payers.
3.6 Conclusion
The bright side of insider ownership is that it improves the alignment between corporate
insiders and shareholders. This paper nevertheless documents evidence of a dark side
of insider ownership using a unique natural experiment that was made possible by the
impending fiscal cliff towards the end of 2012. As a result of a sharp increase in expected
dividend tax rates, many companies rushed to pay out large special dividends before the
end of the year. Individual shareholders (including insiders)—whose dividends are taxed—
would prefer that firms pay out large dividends before the tax rate change, whereas non-
taxable investors would prefer not receiving a special dividend if paying these dividends
would have other adverse consequences for the firm.
We find that firms with high insider ownership were more likely to pay a special dividend
during this period. But for these firms, the choice as to whether to pay a special dividend
was not associated with the share of non-taxable (institutional) as opposed to taxable
shareholders. Notably, the subsample of firms in which insiders have low personal stakes
in the payout decision (i.e., where insiders have low ownership) do respond to the investor
base, and are less likely to announce special dividends when the firm has a higher proportion
of non-taxable investors. The main implication of this finding is that in situations in which
insiders have a strong personal stake in a firm’s decision, they are less likely to be responsive
to the preferences of other shareholders.
We then study the valuation implications of these special dividends. We find that the
effect of the special dividend announcements on firm value is positive on average. The
abnormal returns were, however, significantly lower among firms with higher insider own-
ership combined with higher non-taxable ownership, i.e., where the tax incentives between
insiders and non-insider investors were particularly misaligned. This result shows that
insiders can sacrifice firm value to increase their personal wealth.
Finally, we find that the large special dividends substituted for future dividends and
repurchases, although much of this substitution was weak. Moreover, while these divi-
decreasing during the period for all firms, just not more than among the firms that paid special dividends.
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dend payments consumed large amounts of cash (almost 3% of assets), firms were able to
replenish their cash levels within the following quarter.
Taken together, these results show that insider ownership can lead to inefficient decisions,
in particular when the insiders’ incentives differ from those of other shareholders. Here,
insider ownership is the cause of this inefficiency. An analysis of the trade-off between
the costs and benefits of insider ownership therefore should consider this cost as a distinct
component of this trade-off.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1 Special Dividend Announcements. The dark area plots the cumulative
number of special dividend announcements between July 1, 2011 and December, 31 2011.
The grey area cumulatively plots the number of special dividend announcements between
July 1, 2012 and December, 31 2012. We exclude dividends that are scheduled to be paid
after year-end.
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Table 3.1 Variable Definitions. This table defines the variables used in the paper. All
firm characteristics are as of the fiscal year end of 2011.
Variable Definition
CARspecial The sum of a special-dividend-paying-firm’s abnormal returns over
three days from one trading day before to one trading day after the
announcement of the special dividend.
Payout Policy
Paid special dividend during event
period
A dummy equal to one if a firm announced a special dividend during
the event period and zero otherwise.
Paid special dividend A dummy equal to one if a firm paid special dividends in 2011 and zero
otherwise.
Paid dividend during event period A dummy equal to one if a firm paid any dividend over the event period
and zero otherwise.
Paid dividend A dummy equal to one if a firm paid any dividend in 2011 and zero
otherwise.
Repurchased shares A dummy equal to one if a firm repurchased shares in 2011 and zero
otherwise.
Special-to-market cap Total special dividends paid during the event period, normalized by
market capitalization.
Dividend-to-asset The total dividend amount, divided by the book value of assets
(DVC/AT).
Stock Ownership
Insider ownership The sum of shares held by insiders who are current or past executives
or directors, divided by shares outstanding in the fourth fiscal quarter
of 2011 (Thomson Insiders Database).
Institutional ownership The sum of shares held by institutional investors, divided by shares out-
standing in the fourth fiscal quarter of 2011 (Thomson 13F Database).
Mutual fund ownership The sum of shares held by mutual funds, divided by shares outstanding
in the fourth fiscal quarter of 2011 (Thomson Mutual Fund Holdings
Database).
Other Firm Characteristics
Past return Past five-year stock return, calculated by compounding monthly CRSP
returns.
Size Log (total assets).
Cash-to-assets Cash/Total assets (CHE/AT).
Hadlock-Pierce index Hadlock and Pierce (2010) financial constraints measure.
Average stock price fall on ex-
dividend date
The average of market return adjusted ex-dividend price change over
the past five years.
Insider Trading
Insider sold ratio (Sum of shares sold)/(Sum of shares purchased + Sum of shares sold)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4 Average Stock Price Fall on Ex-dividend Date. This table presents a
comparison of the average stock price fall on ex-dividend dates over the past five years
between firms with high Institutional - MF ownership and firms with low Institutional -
MF ownership. All variables are as defined in Table 3.1. Columns (1) and (2) report the
average stock price fall on ex-dividend date as a fraction of the dividend paid. The
difference between the means is reported in Column (3). p-value of the difference is
reported in Column (4).
Low: 787 firms High: 820 firms Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6 Insider Trading around the Event Period. This table presents the
comparison of insider trading patterns between special dividend paying firms and others.
The difference-in-difference estimation compares the changes in the means of insider sold
ratio for the special dividend paying firms and firms that did not pay a special dividend.
Insider sold ratio is defined in Table 3.1. Special is an indicator of announcing a special
dividend during the event period. Post Election is a dummy variable equal to one for the
period November 2012 - December 2012, and zero for the period September 2012 -
October 2012. In each column, we report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics,
calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable Insider sold ratio
(1)
Special {0, 1} 0.0382
(0.81)
Post Election {0, 1} -0.0003
(-0.02)
Special {0, 1} 0.0691






Table 3.7 Special Dividend Announcement Day CAR. This table presents the
relation between special dividend announcement day CAR and stock ownership. Panel A
reports estimates from OLS regressions with special dividend announcement-date CAR as
the dependent variable. All variables are as defined in Table 3.1. Panel B reports
estimates from a linear probability model with an indicator of CAR being negative as the
dependent variable. In each column, we report estimated coefficients and their
t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by
Fama-French 48 industry classifications. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Announcement Day CAR
Insider ownership 0.0025 0.0615*** 0.0811***
(0.18) (3.92) (4.41)
Institutional - MF ownership 0.0085 0.0064
(0.90) (0.50)
Insider ownership -0.2271*** -0.2461***
* (Institutional - MF ownership) (-3.34) (-3.32)
Constant 0.0172*** 0.0152*** 0.0407***
(7.16) (3.93) (9.65)
N 164 164 164
R2 0.0002 0.0398 0.3274
Panel B: % of Announcements with Negative CAR
Insider ownership -0.078 -1.4344*** -1.9869***
(-0.24) (-3.21) (-3.79)
Institutional - MF ownership -0.1519 -0.3214
(-0.70) (-1.05)
Insider ownership 5.2866** 5.2147**
* (Institutional - MF ownership) (2.67) (2.37)
Constant 0.2866*** 0.3168*** 0.1287
(5.88) (3.95) (1.36)
N 164 164 164
R2 0.0003 0.0378 0.2725
Industry Fixed-effects No No Yes
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Table 3.8 The Effect of Special Dividends on Future Outcome. This table reports
estimates from difference-in-difference regressions to examine the extent to which special
dividends during the event period are related to changes in the following dependent
variables: dividends, share repurchases, and cash. The observations are at the
firm-quarter level. The sample covers firm-quarter observations between January 2010
and July 2013. All the dependent variables are normalized by the book value of lagged
assets. Special is an indicator of announcing a special dividend during the event period.
Event Period is a dummy variable equal to one for the fiscal quarter that includes
November 2012, and zero otherwise. Post Period is a dummy variable equal to one for
the two quarters immediately following the Event Period, and zero otherwise. In each
column, we report estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, calculated using
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Columns (2), (4), and (6) present the
estimation results controlling for firm fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Dividends Dividends Repurchases Repurchases Cash Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Special 0.0031*** 0.0003 0.0192***
(19.56) (1.62) (3.48)
Event Period 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0111*** -0.0102***
(10.89) (16.87) (0.21) (-0.19) (-2.68) (-7.15)
Post Period 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0153*** -0.0152***
(0.11) (-1.09) (-0.77) (-1.89) (-4.70) (-13.48)
Special x Event Period 0.0254*** 0.0255*** -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0299 -0.0297***
(48.17) (78.43) (-0.99) (-0.96) (-1.63) (-4.69)
Special x Post Period -0.0007* -0.0005** -0.0010** -0.0007** -0.0013 0.0022
(-1.74) (-2.03) (-2.28) (-2.10) (-0.09) (0.45)
Constant 0.0022*** 0.0024*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.1955*** 0.1964***
(61.06) (109.91) (41.25) (55.18) (155.85) (465.00)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39,338 39,338 37,781 37,781 39,730 39,730
R2 0.0953 0.6856 0.0002 0.4434 0.0011 0.8903
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Pástor, Ĺubos̆, and Pietro Veronesi, 2003, Stock valuation and learning about profitability,
Journal of Finance, 58, 1749-1790.
Polk, Christopher, and Paola Sapienza, 2009, The stock market and corporate investment:
A test of catering theory, Review of Financial Studies, 22, 187-217.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Financial Dependence and Growth, The
American Economic Review 88(3), 559-586.
Rhodes–Kropf, Matthew, David T. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan, 2005, Valuation waves
and merger activity: The empirical evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, 77,
561-603.
115
Roberge, Michael W., Joseph C. Flaherty, Jr., Robert M. Almeida, Jr., and Andrew
C. Boyd, 2016, Lengthening the investment time horizon, Massachusetts Financial
Services Company White Paper Series.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1990, Equilibrium short horizons of investors
and firms, American Economic Review, 80, 148-153.
Song, Kyojik Roy, and Youngjoo Lee, 2012, Long-term effects of a financial crisis: Evi-
dence from cash holdings of East Asian firms, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 47, 617-641.
Thakor, Richard T, 2016, A theory of efficient short-termism, Working paper.
Zhang, X, 2006, Information uncertainty and stock returns, Journal of Finance 61, 105-
137.
116
